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Guarantor of Last Resort
Kathryn Judge*
The optimal response to a financial crisis entails addressing two, often
conflicting, demands: stopping the panic and starting the clock. When
short-term depositors flee, banks can be forced to sell assets at fire-sale prices,
causing credit to contract and real economic activity to decline. To reduce these
adverse spillover effects, policymakers routinely intervene to stop systemic runs.
All too often, however, policymakers deploy stopgap measures that allow the
underlying problems to fester. To promote long-term economic health, they must
also ferret out the underlying problems and allocate the losses that cannot be
avoided. A well-designed guarantor of last resort can help address these
conflicting demands. Just-in-time guarantees keep private capital in the system,
providing policymakers the time that they need to develop a viable plan to
address deficiencies. A strict time limit on those guarantees ensures that
policymakers and market participants remain motivated to devise such a plan,
avoiding the alternative pitfall of excessive forbearance.
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In wild periods of alarm, one failure makes many, and the best way to prevent
the derivative failures is to arrest the primary failure which causes them.
–Walter Bagehot1
Introduction
How best to fight financial panics is a matter of ongoing debate. On the
one hand, concerns about moral hazard abound. When bank depositors and
other short-term creditors anticipate government protection, they have little
incentive to undertake costly monitoring. This reduces market discipline and
can lead to excessive risk taking. On the other hand, the government cannot
credibly commit to a no-bailout policy.2 As Walter Bagehot recognized
nearly 150 years ago, once panic sets in, the resulting harm extends far
beyond the fleeing creditors and the institutions issuing their claims. Panics
can lead to market dysfunction, credit contraction, and recession.3 The Great
Depression vividly illustrates how ordinary Americans suffer when the
government tries to force bankers to stew in their own juices.4
The macroeconomic cost of financial panics helps to explain the
massive system of ex ante regulation imposed on banks and standing
government-guarantee programs like deposit insurance. These costs and
imperfections in the current regulatory regime have also inspired a range of
ambitious reform proposals. Some favor significantly expanding deposit

1. WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET 51
(1874).
2. See Anthony J. Casey & Eric A. Posner, A Framework for Bailout Regulation, 91 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 479, 482 (2015) (“Bailouts are socially desirable because Congress cannot anticipate
the contingencies that would make possible an ex ante insurance system that regulates behavior and
charges firms in advance for liquidity support or other transfers.”); Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of
Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435, 439 (2011) (“Bailouts are an inevitable feature of modern economies,
in which the interconnectedness of firms means that the entire economy bears the risk of an
individual firm’s failure.”); see also Jeremy Stein, Monetary Policy as Financial Stability
Regulation, 127 Q.J. ECON. 57, 58 (2012) (showing that unregulated banks can issue too much
short-term debt, setting the stage for runs and fire sales and that “the potential for such fire sales
may give rise to a negative externality”).
3. See infra subpart I(A).
4. Ben S. Bernanke, Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the
Great Depression, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 257, 257 (1983) (showing that allowing banks to fail played
a central role in depressing credit creation and magnifying the size of the recession known as the
Great Depression); Gene Smiley, Great Depression, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib
.org/library/Enc/GreatDepression.html [https://perma.cc/M3N7-PZ22] (explaining that “[b]etween
1929 and 1933, 10,763 of the 24,970 commercial banks in the United States failed” and this
contributed to “plummeting production,” soaring unemployment, and a decline in real GNP of
30.5%); see also THEODORE ROSENOF, ECONOMICS IN THE LONG RUN: NEW DEAL THEORISTS AND
THEIR LEGACIES, 1933–1993, 5 (1997) (ebook) (explaining that the Great Depression undermined
assumptions of efficient markets without government intervention and “led to the New Deal’s
enhanced role for government”).

JUDGE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

710

3/31/19 1:37 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 97:707

insurance to cover virtually all short-term debt in the financial system.5
Others favor a system that allows institutions that issue short-term debt to
hold only the safest of assets, eliminating the traditional dual function of
banks as takers of deposits and makers of loans.6 Each of these proposals is
motivated by the inherent fragility of institutions funded with short-term debt
and the government’s inability to commit to nonintervention when that
fragility becomes manifest. Nonetheless, because these proposals would
entail sweeping changes in the structure of the financial system and would
work only if they bucked history and successfully constrained financial
dynamism, they have been rejected time and again as too costly and
infeasible.7
This Article proposes a more modest, and thus more viable, step
forward: authorizing an “Emergency Guarantee Authority” (EGA). An EGA
is a crisis-management system that complements the existing financial
regulatory regime. The proposed EGA would empower the Treasury
Secretary to provide emergency guarantees in order to halt a financial panic
long enough to give policymakers the time they need to devise a longer-term
solution. The Treasury Secretary would have significant discretion to
determine what claims to guarantee and on what terms. This discretion is
critical to enabling the Secretary to respond quickly and to strike at the heart
of the problem even when a threat arises outside the regulated banking sector.

5. E.g., MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL REGULATION 241
(2016); Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS
PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY, Fall 2010, at 261, 284 (quoting GRP. OF THIRTY, FINANCIAL REFORM:
A FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY 29 (2009), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2010/09/2010b_bpea_gorton.pdf [https://perma.cc/7988-FUJ4]); see also ALAN S.
BLINDER & MARK ZANDI, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS:
LESSONS FOR THE NEXT ONE 1 (2015) (calculating that without government intervention, twice as
many Americans would have lost their jobs as a result of the Crisis and gross domestic product
would have declined by 14% rather than 4%).
6. E.g., IRVING FISHER, 100% MONEY 8–10, 18–19 (Vail-Ballou Press, Inc. ed. 1935)
(proposing the conversion of banks into cash-only entities to stabilize the global economy); MILTON
FRIEDMAN, A PROGRAM FOR MONETARY STABILITY 65–76 (Fordham Univ. Press 1959); Adam J.
Levitin, Safe Banking: Finance and Democracy, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 403–07 (2016); see also
Martin Wolf, Banking Remains Far Too Undercapitalised for Comfort, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/9dd43a1a-9d49-11e7-8cd4932067fbf946?desktop=true&conceptId=0f07d468-fc37-3c44-bf19-a81f2aae9f36&segmentId
=dd5c99e9-30be-ddd0-c634-ff3a0c2b738f#myft:notification:daily-email:content:headline:html
[https://perma.cc/HEL3-Z7JS] (noting that since the Crisis “[a] number of serious people have
proposed radical reforms” in financial intermediation and describing some of the other proposals).
7. See Morgan Ricks, Safety First? The Deceptive Allure of Full Reserve Banking, 83 U. CHI.
L. REV. ONLINE 113, 114, 118–19 (2017) (explaining why narrow banking proposals are not likely
to work as hoped); see also Kathryn Judge, The Importance of “Money,” 130 HARV. L. REV. 1148,
1155–56 (2017) (reviewing MORGAN RICKS, THE MONEY PROBLEM: RETHINKING FINANCIAL
REGULATION (2016)) (explaining why Morgan Ricks’s innovative proposal to limit the issuance of
short-term debt and have the government guarantee all such debt is unlikely to panic-proof the
financial system).
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This discretion would be curbed by procedural constraints, reporting
requirements, a prohibition on repeat protection, and a strict time limit. The
EGA and any guarantees extended pursuant to that authority would expire in
two years from the time the EGA is first invoked.
In contrast to many recent reforms and reform proposals, the EGA does
not purport to prevent or solve the challenge of financial fragility. Its aim,
instead, is resilience—reducing the macroeconomic costs of financial crises
and preserving the accountability that so often is compromised when panic
takes hold.
The banking literature provides a number of explanations for why shortterm creditors run, with some focused on coordination challenges and others
on information dynamics.8 Guarantees are one of the only government
interventions that can stop a run irrespective of the reasons for it.9 Experience
further affirms the distinct value of guarantees. Regulators in the United
States and abroad regularly used guarantees during the Crisis, even when they
had to stretch their legal authority to do so.10 Creating an EGA would provide
financial regulators the tool they need to contain a growing financial crisis
while also institutionalizing constraints to ensure that they remain motivated
to address the underlying problems underlying a panic. By enabling
policymakers to act quickly to contain a systemic crisis while also deterring
forbearance, the EGA can help mitigate the most significant mechanisms
through which problems in the financial sector can harm the real economy.
A second but no less important function of the proposed EGA is to
preserve the democratic legitimacy that is so often compromised when a
crisis strikes. By expanding the capacity of the executive branch to act
quickly to contain a crisis while also institutionalizing a role for Congress,
the EGA sets up an infrastructure through which elected officials can
preserve and promote values beyond economic health. The political unrest
and lack of trust in public and private institutions since the Crisis attest to the
need to address fairness and other concerns alongside trying to protect the
real economy from harm.11
Examining crises through an informational lens illuminates how the
EGA can help address so many of the challenges that crises can pose. The

8. See infra Part I.
9. See infra Part II (showing that each of the major U.S. financial regulators used guaranteelike interventions during the Crisis); Franklin Allen et al., Moral Hazard and Government
Guarantees in the Banking Industry, 1 J. FIN. REG. 30, 34, fig.1 (2015) (showing that nine countries
provided unlimited deposit insurance during the Crisis and virtually all others, including the United
States, increased those limits significantly when the Crisis hit).
10. See supra note 9.
11. PEW RESEARCH CENTER, Beyond Distrust: How Americans View Their Government
(2015),
http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/beyond-distrust-how-americans-view-theirgovernment/ [https://perma.cc/8MWY-L5HL].
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key is to start with a realistic set of assumptions regarding what elected
officials, regulators, market participants, and others actually know when a
crisis first hits.12 When bank depositors and other short-term creditors run,
they are often running because they have good reason to question the safety
of the claims they are holding.13 To achieve lasting stability, policymakers
must understand, address, and convince market participants that they
understand and have addressed the underlying weaknesses triggering the
runs. As former Federal Reserve official Donald Kohn explains: “The key to
turning the situation around [in the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis] was
identifying all the problems and coming up with detailed and credible plans
for dealing with them across their many dimensions.”14 Empirical work
examining a broader set of crises supports Kohn’s assessment.15 Developing
a comprehensive plan, however, and getting feedback from elected officials
and other constituencies takes time. The EGA buys that time. It allays the
panic long enough for policymakers to gather and analyze pertinent
information, weigh competing values, and devise a viable plan for addressing
deficiencies and addressing the fairness and other issues that might be at
stake.
The EGA will not prevent the next panic. And, given the inevitable
vagaries of any crisis and the messiness of politics, there can be no assurances
of how the EGA will be used when the time comes.16 Acknowledging
institutional and informational realities, however, reveals the modesty of the
proposal to be a virtue, not a bug. Rather than purporting to answer in
advance all of the difficult questions a crisis presents, the EGA creates a
framework that aligns accountability with authority, facilitates the

12. FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xvi–xvii (2011),
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf [https://perma.cc/P7M2-VGQM]
[hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT] (observing that “[t]echnology has transformed
the efficiency, speed, and complexity of financial instruments and transactions”); VOLCKER
ALLIANCE, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: BANKING IN THE SHADOWS 39–40 (2016) [hereinafter
VOLCKER ALLIANCE REPORT], http://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments
/VolckerAlliance_UnfinishedBusinessBankingInTheShadows.pdf [https://perma.cc/L9CR-C5XS];
Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV.
843, 843 (2016).
13. Charles W. Calomiris & Gary Gorton, The Origins of Banking Panics: Models, Facts, and
Bank Regulation, in NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RES., FINANCIAL MARKETS AND FINANCIAL CRISES
109, 121 (R. Glenn Hubbard ed., 1991). If the challenge triggering the panic truly is just a
coordination game, the guarantee itself might enable order to be restored.
14. Donald Kohn, Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst., The European Crises—Banking Challenges
(July 12, 2012), https://www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/the-european-crises-banking-challenges/
[https://perma.cc/7DLC-SW4G].
15. Luc Laeven & Fabian Valencia, The Use of Blanket Guarantees in Banking Crises, 31 J.
INT’L MONEY & FIN. 1220, 1221 (showing that “the provision of liquidity support responds more
strongly to the announcement and implementation of comprehensive bank restructuring policies
than to the announcement of blanket guarantees” and explaining that clear and credible policies
negate the need for blanket guarantees).
16. See infra subpart V(A).
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information generation and the exercise of informed judgments, and enables
different types of policymakers to play roles consistent with their distinct
competencies. And the EGA makes crisis containment more likely and
excessive forbearance less so, even if it cannot assure any particular outcome.
This is significant improvement over the status quo.
The Article proceeds in five parts. Part I lays the foundation. It examines
the origins, utility, and limits of having a central bank serve as a lender of
last resort, the most well recognized crisis-fighting tool. It also introduces the
literature on financial dynamism and why short-term creditors run, and it
clarifies how each phenomenon helps explain the value of a guarantor of last
resort. Part II addresses the use of emergency guarantees during the Crisis.
Part III presents the proposal and considers how it compares to what
happened during the Crisis. Part IV examines the virtues of the proposed
EGA using different frameworks to highlight the different challenges it can
help overcome. Part V addresses some drawbacks.
I.

From Lender of Last Resort to Guarantor of Last Resort

A.

Bagehot
Walter Bagehot’s Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market,
originally published in 1873, continues to be “the bible” for how central
banks should respond during periods of systemic distress.17 In Lombard
Street, Bagehot describes the inherently cyclical and fragile nature of the
British financial system of his time.18 As he explains: “The peculiar essence
of our banking system is an unprecedented trust between man and man: and
when that trust is much weakened by hidden causes, a small accident may
greatly hurt it, and a great accident for a moment may almost destroy it.”19
Thus, in the face of a panic, the central bank ought not stand idly by. Rather,
it should use its unique position to counteract the panic and the dramatic loss
of liquidity that arises when depositors and other short-term claimants refuse
to accept anything but cash or specie as money-like. They should follow the

17. TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES 118 (2014);
Peter Conti-Brown, Misreading Walter Bagehot: What Lombard Street Really Means for Central
Banking, THE NEW RAMBLER (Dec. 14, 2015), https://newramblerreview.com/bookreviews/economics/misreading-walter-bagehot-what-lombard-street-really-means-for-centralbanking [https://perma.cc/88FQ-W6GV] (reviewing WALTER BAGEHOT, LOMBARD STREET: A
DESCRIPTION OF THE MONEY MARKET (1873)); see also Vincent Bignon et al., Bagehot for
Beginners: The Making of Lender-of-Last-Resort Operations in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, 65
ECON. HIST. REV. 580, 582 (2012); Kathryn Judge, The Federal Reserve: A Study in Soft
Constraints, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 65, 79–82 (2015).
18. See generally, BAGEHOT, supra note 1, at 122–59.
19. Id. at 158–59.
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approach used by the Bank of England in 1825, when it loaned money by
“every possible means and in modes [it] had never adopted before.”20
Central bank intervention is critical, Bagehot explains, because
“managing a panic” is not “mainly a ‘banking’ problem. It is primarily a
mercantile one,” which can have serious and adverse effects on trade if not
addressed appropriately.21 Bagehot also laid out a vision for how a central
bank ought to help quell a panic, emphasizing the importance of having a
central bank make clear in advance that it would serve as a lender of last
resort during times of systemic distress.22
Bernanke and other leading policymakers regularly invoked a set of
principles collectively known as “Bagehot’s dictum” to explain and defend
their actions during the Crisis.23 The dictum has come to stand for the
proposition that during times of systemic distress, a central bank should lend
freely, against good collateral, to solvent banks, at a penalty rate.24 Economic
historians have pointed out that this precise formulation cannot be located in
the original text and that differences between the financial system that
motivated Bagehot’s work and finance today increase the wedge between
Bagehot’s initial contribution and the ways in which his dictum gets invoked
today.25 Few disagree, however, that Bagehot’s Lombard Street played a
definitive role in cementing the notion that central banks ought to act as
lenders of last resort to calm and help avert financial crises.
20. Id. at 51.
21. Id. at 52.
22. Id. at 51; see also Conti-Brown, supra note 17 (suggesting that the “failure of the Bank of
England . . . to acknowledge . . . that they were the lender of last resort . . . set Bagehot off” and the
book is largely “an argument about why this acknowledgment is so important”).
23. BEN S. BERNANKE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: LECTURES BY
BEN S. BERNANKE 7, 29, 74, 83, 97 (2013) (repeatedly invoking Bagehot’s dictum, including in
defense of the decision not to bail out Lehman Brothers); NEIL IRWIN, THE ALCHEMISTS: THREE
CENTRAL BANKERS AND A WORLD ON FIRE 10 (2013) (noting that Trichet (the head of the
European Central Bank), Bernanke, and King (the head of the U.K.’s central bank) “often invoked
Bagehot’s words as a model for their own crisis response almost 150 years” after he wrote them);
John L. Walker, Emergency Tools to Contain a Financial Crisis, 35 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 669,
711 (2016) (“In explaining this governmental authority to intervene in times of financial crisis,
commentators traditionally rely on the principles developed by Walter Bagehot in 1873.”).
24. E.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Failure of the Clearinghouse: Dodd-Frank’s Fatal Flaw?, 10 VA.
L. & BUS. REV. 127, 154 (2015); Eric A. Posner, What Legal Authority Does the Fed Need During
a Financial Crisis?, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1529, 1532–33 (2017); Walker, supra note 23, at 714–16,
715 n.150; Robert F. Weber, Post-Crisis Reform of the Supervisory System and High Reliability
Theory, 50 GA. L. REV. 249, 275–76 (2015); Brian F. Madigan, Dir., Div. of Monetary Affairs,
Speech at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City’s Annual Economic Symposium: Bagehot’s
Dictum in Practice: Formulating and Implementing Policies to Combat the Financial Crisis
(Aug. 21,
2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/madigan20090821a.htm
[https://perma.cc/2MLC-D3FN].
25. E.g., Bignon et al., supra note 17, at 580–81, 603; Conti-Brown, supra note 17; see also
Posner, supra note 24, at 1538–41 (explaining the evolution of Bagehot’s principles in light of the
evolution of banking).
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B.

The Reasons for Runs and the Limits of a Lender of Last Resort
The literature on the reasons for bank runs sheds light on the utility and
limits of a lender of last resort (LOLR) in fighting panics. There are two types
of theories about the reasons that short-term creditors run.26 Some suggest
that runs are largely a byproduct of coordination challenges.27 Most of a
bank’s assets are long-term and relatively illiquid, while much of its funding
takes the form of short-term liabilities like demand deposits. If a large
proportion of short-term creditors demand their money back at the same time,
a bank can be forced to sell assets at discounted “fire-sale” prices, reducing
the aggregate value of those assets. As a result, short-term creditors who are
late to demand their money back may get less than the full value of their
claims, even if the bank was solvent prior to the run. This gives short-term
creditors an incentive to be among the first to withdraw in a run, even if they
believe their bank is otherwise healthy. That runs can be self-fulfilling
prophecies was most famously modeled by Douglas Diamond and Philip
Dybvig in 1983, well over a century after Bagehot’s insights regarding the
value of having a LOLR and half a century after the United States
implemented a deposit-insurance scheme that can be rationalized on the same
basis.28 There are now numerous formal models demonstrating how
coordination challenges among short-term creditors can explain bank runs
and why it can be rational for short-term creditors to make withdrawals even
from solvent institutions.29
The second set of theories focuses on information. Most of these models
focus on information asymmetries between bank managers and holders of the
short-term debt a bank issues.30 The core idea is that bank depositors run
when they have reason to suspect a bank may not be able to make good on
all of its outstanding claims. Some of these models highlight the capacity of
short-term debt to discipline bank managers, inducing good behavior and
helping to surmount commitment challenges.31 More recent work suggests

26. Franklin Allen et al., Financial Crises: Theory and Evidence, 1 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 97,
99–100 (2009).
27. E.g., Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 12, at 121.
28. Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity,
91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402 (1983).
29. For an overview of this work, see HAL SCOTT, CONNECTEDNESS AND CONTAGION:
PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM FROM PANICS (2016).
30. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 26, at 99–100 (explaining that the literature generally falls
into two camps, one which “maintains that panics are undesirable events caused by random deposit
withdrawals unrelated to changes in the real economy” and a second that “describes banking crises
as a natural outgrowth of the business cycle”).
31. E.g., Charles W. Calomiris & Charles M. Kahn, The Role of Demandable Debt in
Structuring Optimal Banking Arrangements, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 497, 509–10 (1991); Douglas W.
Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, Liquidity Risk, Liquidity Creation, and Financial Fragility: A
Theory of Banking, 109 J. POL. ECON. 287, 289 (2001).
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that as the financial system has become more complicated and
interconnected, uncertainty32 and information gaps33 may also be important
sources of fragility.
Although sometimes cast as competing explanations for bank runs,
coordination and information-based theories can also be seen as
complements—with the various dynamics contributing to the magnitude of
the run triggered by a particular shock. These theories also help to explain
the inherent fragility of any institution that relies on short-term debt to fund
longer term, less liquid assets, irrespective of whether that institution is a
bank or merely bank-like. With the rise of market-based intermediation, often
referred to as “shadow banking,” the institutions in question may look quite
different than a traditional bank, and short-term creditors may exit by failing
to roll over short-term debt when it matures rather than making a
“withdrawal,” but the nature of the inherent fragility is quite similar to the
threat long posed by a potential run on the bank.34
Understanding the reasons why short-term creditors run illuminates the
value of having a lender of last resort. If short-term creditors are running
solely because they are worried that other creditors will run—as the
coordination theory predicts—the presence of a lender of last resort can
theoretically stop a run before it even starts.35 When a bank can readily obtain
fresh liquidity by posting illiquid assets as collateral, and thus can avoid
costly fire sales, short-term creditors have no reason to run on healthy
institutions. A lender of last resort can thus play an important role in
enhancing stability.
At the same time, understanding why short-term creditors run also
reveals the limits on when a lender of last resort alone can forestall panic. A
lender of last resort that adheres to Bagehot’s dictum will provide fresh
liquidity only to healthy institutions and only when that institution can
provide sufficient, acceptable collateral. The capacity of this type of facility
to stop a run depends critically on both the financial health of the institution
receiving the loan and what short-term creditors know about its health.36 As
Charles Calomiris and Urooj Khan have explained:
32. Ricardo J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Collective Risk Management in a Flight to
Quality Episode, 63 J. FIN. 2195, 2197 (2008).
33. Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411, 443–44
(2017).
34. See Gary Gorton & Andrew Metrick, Securitized Banking and the Run on Repo, 104 J. FIN.
ECON. 425, 426, 445–46 (2012) (arguing that the 2008 financial crisis resembled nineteenth century
banking panics with the demand for higher “repo haircuts” having a comparable economic effect as
runs by bank depositors).
35. SCOTT, supra note 29, at 137 (“The beauty of the power of a strong lender of last resort is
the power would never have to be used because runs would be deterred by the knowledge that the
Fed would do what it took.”).
36. See infra subpart IV(A).
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Collateralized lending does not work . . . when bank illiquidity is a
symptom of substantially increased default risk of the bank. In such
circumstances, the use of collateralized lending can actually
exacerbate the liquidity problems of a bank by effectively
subordinating the bank’s depositors to the central bank or government
lender . . . .37
As a result, when a run is triggered by concerns about a bank’s health,
“a collateralized loan . . . might even cause a depositor run rather than
prevent one.”38 A lender of last resort is thus most effective when short-term
creditors are running because of concerns about the behavior of other
creditors, and far less so when they are running because of concerns about
the health of the bank issuing their claim.
Another condition that must be satisfied for a lender of last resort alone
to bring about calm is that short-term creditors must have credible
information about the health of their bank and the mix of assets it holds. More
concretely, in the face of a panic, a lender of last resort will deter short-term
creditors from running only if those short-term creditors know that their
institution is solvent and that it has enough collateral in forms that the central
bank will accept to address the liquidity demands it is facing, taking into
account the haircut the central bank will impose.39 Without such information,
it can still be rational for short-term creditors to run, even from institutions
subsequently revealed to be solvent.
Adding historical and institutional context suggests that both conditions
will rarely be satisfied. First, history suggests that runs and banking crises
usually arise at times when depositors have legitimate reasons to be
concerned about bank health, even if coordination challenges play a
meaningful role in exacerbating a run.40 Second, short-term creditors often
possess—and want to possess—minimal information about the actual value
of the collateral underlying their claims.41 Short-term creditors choose to hold
such claims because they desire a safe asset about which they need do little

37. Charles W. Calomiris & Urooj Kahn, An Assessment of TARP Assistance to Financial
Institutions, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 53, 62 (2015).
38. Id.
39. A haircut refers to the discount resulting from the difference between the face value of the
assets that a bank is posting as collateral and the amount of fresh liquidity that the central bank will
provide against that collateral. Haircuts help protect a lender from the credit risk of collateral.
40. History suggests that bank health is important in explaining runs, even if coordination
challenges play a meaningful role exacerbating a run. Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 13, at 112,
143–45.
41. Bengt Holmstrom, Understanding the Role of Debt in the Financial System 12–13 (Bank
for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 479, 2015), https://www.bis.org/publ/work479.htm
[https://perma.cc/3D8A-9EPQ].
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due diligence.42 The relatively information-insensitive nature of short-term
debt is one of the reasons that holders are willing to pay a premium for these
instruments, and this debt is often structured specifically to enable a shortterm creditor to walk away rather than undertake meaningful diligence should
questions arise.43 Guarantees operate to maintain the information-insensitive
nature of this short-term debt, allowing holders to substitute the
creditworthiness of the government for the need to have any information
about the private assets underlying their claims.
C.

How a Guarantor of Last Resort Is Different
Putting this together: When short-term creditors have incomplete
information and questions about the value of their claims, a lender of last
resort alone cannot stop a run. The capacity of a central bank to provide
collateralized loans to mitigate system-wide liquidity crunches may be a
useful complement to other tools when seeking to contain a financial crisis.
The presence of a lender of last resort may also deter pure coordination-based
runs. But a lender of last resort that truly adheres to the modern formulation
of Bagehot’s dictum, and thus is lending only to institutions that the central
bank knows to be solvent and only against collateral it knows to be good,
cannot stop a run when short-term creditors are running because of doubts
about the health of banks or the value of the assets they hold. When one
moves beyond the regulated banking sector to domains not subject to prior
oversight, the likelihood that a central bank will have sufficient information
to make accurate determinations regarding the health of institutions and the
value of collateral declines further, further reducing the adequacy of a
Bagehot-style lender of last resort.44
A guarantor of last resort, by contrast, obviates the need for the holders

42. Id.; see also Gary Gorton et al., The Safe-Asset Share, AM. ECON. REV., May 2012, at 101,
101 (discussing the value of information-insensitive, or “safe,” debt as collateral).
43. See Gary Gorton, The Development of Opacity in U.S. Banking, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 825,
827 (2014) (stating that a financial claim operating as “money,” the primary function of short-term
debt, requires “eliminating informative financial markets”); Arvind Krishnamurthy & Annette
Vissing-Jorgensen, The Aggregate Demand for Treasury Debt, 120 J. POL. ECON. 233, 235 (2012)
(finding that Treasuries enjoyed a monetary premium that averaged seventy-three basis points
between 1926 and 2008); Gary B. Gorton, The History and Economics of Safe Assets 1–2, 9, 20
(Nat’l
Bureau
of
Econ.
Research,
Working
Paper
No.
22210,
2016),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w22210 [https://perma.cc/6ZVE-JX8M] (providing an overview of the
literature showing there is a “convenience yield,” that is, the willingness of holders of money-like
claims to pay a premium for the money-like qualities); Holmstrom, supra note 41, at 3 (“Opacity is
a natural feature of money markets . . . .”).
44. As I explain in other work, the purpose of Bagehot’s dictum has evolved over time. No
longer does it aim merely to address the moral hazard that arises from access to a lender of last
resort. It is also used to justify continuing to house lender-of-last-resort authority in a central bank,
even as central banks have become clear government actors, but ones largely immune from direct
political accountability.
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of short-term debt to know anything about the health of the institution issuing
a claim or the value of collateral backing it. The reason for a run no longer
matters. A guarantee will work regardless of whether the run is the byproduct
of coordination issues, information dynamics, or some combination thereof.45
This is because a properly designed guarantee renders all of these issues
effectively irrelevant. Assuming market participants trust the government to
make good on its guarantees (which can be a real limit), a government
guarantee protects the claimant even if other claimants run, and even if shortterm creditors have good reason to be worried about the health of the
institution issuing their claims. Guarantees, whether provided through a
standing deposit insurance scheme or through an emergency measure like the
EGA, can render the claims “information insensitive.” It can restore that
special characteristic that makes short-term claims so useful and pervasive,
even if also a source of so much fragility. Restoring this feature can be critical
when the aim is to get private short-term creditors to stick around even when
it is cheap to run and without such an assurance it would be the rational path
for them to take.
None of this rebuts that the Fed played a critical role in containing the
Crisis. Systemic liquidity shortages were a major challenge throughout, and
the Fed’s interventions helped to mitigate these effects.46 The efficacy of
many of the Fed’s interventions, however, was dependent on the fact that it
regularly deviated from Bagehot’s dictum in the policies it adopted. From its
willingness to support institutions of questionable creditworthiness, like
AIG, to accepting as collateral assets of uncertain value, as it did with Bear
Stearns, and to offering highly attractive interest rates throughout, the Fed
was doing what it took while seemingly trying to adhere, at least at the
margins, to the limits the law imposed on it.47 Looking closely at the ways
the Fed used its authority, there were even times that its interventions more
resembled guarantees than senior, collateralized lending.48 The core point
here is that the notion that the Fed adhered to Bagehot’s dictum is largely a
fiction, as is the notion that a central bank can stop a crisis while adhering to

45. See infra subpart IV(A) (providing a more detailed account of the benefits of
institutionalizing a guarantor of last resort).
46. E.g., MARK J. FLEMING, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., FEDERAL RESERVE LIQUIDITY
PROVISION DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2007–2009, STAFF REPORT NO. 563, at 1–2, 20
(2012), https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr563.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SEY8-XBFM] (providing an overview of the Fed’s liquidity programs and the empirical
work conducted on their efficacy, leading to the conclusion that “[t]he evidence uncovered to
date . . . broadly supports the conclusion that the programs were effective at mitigating the strains
in financial markets”).
47. See id. at 9, 13, 19 (noting that the Fed provided financial support to AIG and “special
financing” for Bear); see also supra section II(A)(2).
48. See infra Part II.

JUDGE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

720

3/31/19 1:37 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 97:707

such constraints.49 A lender of last resort may be useful during periods of
systemic distress, but it alone does not suffice to stop all systemic panics.
Expanding the lens beyond stability provides further insight into the
limits of relying too heavily on a central bank, acting without direct
authorization from a more accountable body, during a crisis, and hence the
relative benefits of the proposed EGA. The Bank of England of Bagehot’s
time was a far more private institution than most central banks today.50 He
was not particularly concerned about issues like legitimacy or democratic
accountability. The situation has changed. Today, the Federal Reserve, the
Bank of England, and most other central banks are government bodies, albeit
exceptionally independent ones, and their ongoing viability depends on some
degree of public trust.
These “political” considerations are relevant here because crisismanagement interventions often produce winners and losers, even when
designed to enhance the size of the overall pie. The perception that the Fed’s
interventions looked out for Wall Street over Main Street has been an
ongoing source of consternation for many, and a contributing factor in
subsequent popular backlash. One of the early and most visible embodiments
of this backlash was the Occupy Wall Street Movement, which eventually
“ignited a national and global movement calling out the ruling class of elites
by connecting the dots between corporate and political power.”51 This
movement has had a profound effect on political outcomes on both sides of
the Atlantic.52 Although numerous other factors further contributed to this
uprising, it serves as a powerful reminder of the long-term costs that can arise
when concerns about democratic legitimacy are ignored in crisis
management.
These political considerations, and the assumption that they shape the
long-term costs of crisis-era interventions, help distinguish the EGA from
recent proposals to expand the authority of the Federal Reserve to provide
49. Calomiris & Kahn, supra note 37, at 62; Posner, supra note 24, at 1538–40.
50. See SCOTT, supra note 29, at 109 (explaining that from its founding until long after
Bagehot’s work, the Bank of England operated as a private corporation formed pursuant to a Royal
Charter).
51. Michael Levitin, The Triumph of Occupy Wall Street, ATLANTIC (June 10, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/06/the-triumph-of-occupy-wall-street/395408/
[https://perma.cc/WQ3Z-28D5].
52. See Noah Barkin, After Trump and Brexit, Populist Tsunami Threatens European
Mainstream, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-populistsanalysis/after-trump-and-brexit-populist-tsunami-threatens-european-mainstreamidUSKBN1341I1 [https://perma.cc/W3RP-KBV6]; Owen Matthews, Beyond Brexit: Europe’s
Populist Backlash Against Immigration and Globalization, NEWSWEEK (June 28, 2016)
http://www.newsweek.com/2016/07/08/britain-brexit-wounds-european-nationalism-475101.html
[http://perma.cc/F6UC-ARVA]; Simon Shuster, The Populists, TIME, http://time.com/time-personof-the-year-populism/ [https://perma.cc/XC7E-L4KG] (discussing the 2016 U.S. election’s effect
on the rise of populist decentralization and disintegration in Europe).
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more expansive support during a crisis. A number of highly respected
academics, such as Hal Scott and Eric Posner, have voiced concerns akin to
those here.53 They recognize that a Bagehot-style lender of last resort cannot
suffice to contain a panic and are troubled by the post-crisis reforms that pull
back, rather than expand, the Fed’s authority to intervene to contain a
growing crisis.54 In their analyses, however, this is reason to provide the Fed
greater authority to provide guarantees and potentially even to take more
drastic and obviously fiscal steps to stabilize fragile firms in the midst of a
panic.55 The proposal here rejects such an approach. The two-year time limit
on guarantees issued pursuant to the EGA institutionalizes a mechanism
whereby Congress must authorize any longer-term support. Although the
breadth of the guarantee is designed to obviate the need for regulators to
comply with the fiction that they can and should draw hard lines between
solvent and insolvent firms at the height of a crisis, the time-limits nature of
the guarantees precludes them from being used as a tool to recapitalize firms
or provide other long-term fiscal support. The design gives regulators the
time and incentives to determine where fiscal support may be warranted and
then requires them to report these findings and recommendations to
Congress. It thus introduces a procedure for allocating explicitly fiscal
decisions to Congress while providing a pragmatic approach to stabilizing
the system in the short run so Congress can have the time and information
required to make those decisions. Put differently, the EGA builds a procedure
for answering the hard questions a crisis will pose rather than purporting to
answer them all in advance.
D.

Ongoing Relevance: Action and Creativity
In dismissing the notion that a lender of last resort acting within the
constraints attributed to Bagehot can suffice to contain a crisis, the analysis
here does not rebut the deeper insights motivating his claims.56 Among his
key insights were his recognition of the potential for panics to inflict

53. SCOTT, supra note 29, at 268–71; Posner, supra note 24, at 1567–68.
54. See SCOTT, supra note 29, at 79–80, 93–94 (juxtaposing the need for the presence of a
strong lender of last resort to ensure financial stability and the dangers of the restrictions placed on
the Fed’s lending powers by the Dodd-Frank Act); Posner, supra note 24, at 1571 (“The recent
financial crisis shows why [additional] powers are necessary and the conventional Bagehot
approach is inadequate.”).
55. See SCOTT, supra note 29, at 93, 137–44 (discussing possible reforms to strengthen the
Fed’s role to provide greater stability); Posner, supra note 24, at 1568–69, 1575 (identifying limits
placed on the Fed and arguing Congress should have “gathered as many of those [lender-of-lastresort] powers as possible into the hands of the Fed”).
56. An alternative, and not inconsistent, explanation is that central bankers frequently invoked
Bagehot during the Crisis because they knew they were stretching the bounds of lawful and
acceptable behavior, and his dictum was the most readily amenable principled norm to explain and
defend their actions. See Judge, supra note 17, at 80–82.
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widespread costs, his acknowledgment that intervention was warranted to
avert these costs, and the value of flexibility and creativity in crafting those
interventions.57 These lessons also lay a foundation for understanding the
value of having a guarantor of last resort alongside a lender of last resort.
Recognizing that allowing the market forces to run unabated when panic
sets in can have deleterious effects far in excess of the losses on withdrawing
creditors and the banks issuing their claims is integral to understanding
Bagehot’s claim that central banks should intervene. Subsequent experience
and empirical work affirm that when a systemic crisis hits, there are systemic
repercussions.58 Because of interconnections, common exposures, and
signaling, the failure of one bank can trigger runs on other, even potentially
sound, institutions.59 The failure of banks and bank-like institutions, in turn,
can lead to a loss of information, liquidity hoarding, and a reduction in credit
for the real economy, harming growth.60 As explained by Neel Kashkari,
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis:
Failures of large financial institutions pose massively asymmetric
risks to society . . . . A very crude analogy is that of a nuclear reactor.

57. BAGEHOT, supra note 1, at 51–54.
58. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-180, FINANCIAL CRISIS LOSSES AND
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 15, 18, 20 (2013) (providing a broad overview of
the literature on the myriad costs of the Crisis, including: output losses in the “range from several
trillion to over $10 trillion,” “the longest stretch of unemployment above 8 percent in the United
States since the Great Depression,” and a decline in “median household net worth [of] $49,100 per
family, or by nearly 39 percent, between 2007 and 2010”); David Luttrell et al., Assessing the Costs
and Consequences of the 2007–09 Financial Crisis and Its Aftermath, FED. RESERVE BANK OF
DALL.
ECON.
LETTER,
Sept.
2013,
at
1,
https://www.dallasfed.org
/~/media/Documents/research/eclett/2013/el1307.ashx [https://perma.cc/A42L-PSTF] (estimating
that “the cost of the crisis, assuming [optimistically that] output eventually returns to its precrisis
trend path, is an output loss of $6 trillion to $14 trillion,” which “amounts to $50,000 to $120,000
for every U.S. household”); Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, The Aftermath of Financial
Crises 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14656, 2009),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14656.pdf [https://perma.cc/3359-FACN] (finding that “financial
crises are protracted affairs” that usually “share three characteristics”: (1) “deep and prolonged”
“asset market collapses,” with “[r]eal housing price declines averag[ing] 35 percent stretched out
over six years”; (2) “profound declines in output and employment,” including an “unemployment
rate [that] rises an average of 7 percentage points”; and (3) the “real value of government debt tends
to explode, rising an average of 86 percent in the major post-World War II episodes”).
59. XAVIER FREIXAS & JEAN-CHARLES ROCHET, MICROECONOMICS OF BANKING 195–96
(1997); Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Financial Contagion, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1, 2 (2000); Xavier
Freixas et al., Systemic Risk, Interbank Relations, and Liquidity Provision by the Central Bank, 32
J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 611, 611–12 (2000).
60. See FREIXAS & ROCHET, supra note 59, at 310 (explaining that because banks arise to solve
information asymmetries and other market imperfections, those imperfections re-emerge as frictions
that impede activity when banks fail); Joe Peek & Eric Rosengren, Credit Supply Disruptions: From
Credit Crunches to Financial Crisis, 8 ANN. REV. FIN. ECON. 81, 82 (2016) (identifying “a variety
of empirical and theoretical papers” showing how the “loss of bank capital could cause capitalconstrained banks to shrink lending and . . . this loss of credit availability could have deleterious
effects on the real economy”).
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The cost . . . of letting a reactor melt down is astronomical. Given that
cost, governments will do whatever they can to stabilize the reactor
before they lose control.61
It is this same asymmetry that makes it virtually impossible, and unwise, for
the government not to intervene in the face of a financial panic.
The importance of creativity in fashioning a response capable of
containing a crisis also remains pertinent. Time and again, particularly in the
United States, bank-like activity migrates outside of the regulated banking
sector. Although much of the formal work on the mechanisms of contagion
focus on banking, bank-like structures are exposed to similar risks, and it is
often in these domains where crises first arise. As Kashkari recognizes:
“[W]e won’t see the next crisis coming, and it won’t look like what we might
be expecting.”62 As further explained by Federal Reserve Chair Janet Yellen:
“We simply have to expect that when we draw regulatory boundaries, and
supervise intensely within them, that there is the prospect that activities will
move outside those boundaries and we won’t be able to detect them, and if
we can, we won’t have adequate regulatory tools.”63 Ex ante regulation
simply cannot keep pace with financial innovation.64
U.S. history supports these assessments. Based on his examination of
the twelve most significant financial crises in U.S. history, Hugh Rockoff
concluded that eleven of the twelve arose in some form of shadow banking
system.65 In a similar spirit, Gary Gorton explains: “The cause of financial
crises is the vulnerability of . . . forms of money that are usually the shortterm liabilities of financial intermediaries,” such as “private bank notes . . . ,
demand deposits . . . [,] commercial paper, [and] sale and repurchase
agreements . . . . These forms of money exist for a reason, to conduct
transactions, but they are vulnerable to sudden revocation, withdrawal, or

61. Neel Kashkari, Pres., Fed. Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Remarks at the Brookings
Institution: Lessons from the Crisis: Ending Too Big to Fail 4 (Feb. 16, 2016),
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/~/media/files/news_events/pres/kashkari-ending-tbtf-02-162016.pdf [https://perma.cc/99BL-A3A8].
62. Id. at 3.
63. Pedro Nicolaci da Costa & Ben Leubsdorf, Fed’s Yellen Says Regulating Shadow Banks a
‘Huge Challenge’, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2014, 1:03 PM) https://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2014/07
/02/feds-yellen-says-regulating-shadow-banks-a-huge-challenge/ [https://perma.cc/73L9-YT5P];
see also Kashkari, supra note 61, at 3 (stating that “we won’t see the next crisis coming, and it won’t
look like what we might be expecting”).
64. Iman Anabtawi & Steven L. Schwarcz, Regulating Ex Post: How Law Can Address the
Inevitability of Financial Failure, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 75, 96 (2013).
65. Hugh Rockoff, It Is Always the Shadow Banks: The Failures that Ignited America’s
Financial Panics 12, 38–40 tbl.2 (Oct. 13, 2014) (unpublished manuscript),
https://indiana.edu/~caepr/Conferences/Wicker/Panics%20%2010-17-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NE98-Q7U6].
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exit.”66 Moreover, as he explains, there is a pattern to where and how these
private forms of money arise.67 During periods of growth, the short-term
instruments issued by the private sector, including those issued by non-banks,
appear remarkably safe.68 And when truly safe assets are in relatively short
supply and costly to hold, market participants start to treat these privately
issued forms of money as substitutes.69 Empirical evidence supports this
analysis.70 Market participants recognize that privately issued short-term debt
is not a perfect substitute for fiat money (or gold), but during periods of
growth, when the demand for money-like assets for transaction and liquiditystoring purposes outstrips the supply of truly safe assets, private instruments
regularly are priced in a way that suggests they are providing the same type
of nonpecuniary benefits provided by government instruments and insured
bank deposits. And, as just discussed, this is not irrational from the
perspective of the holders of that short-term debt. It is the system that suffers
far more than short-term creditors themselves when debt holders exit en
masse.71
The widespread costs of uncontrolled panics and the dynamism of
financial markets are the foundation from which this Article builds. The large
externalities that arise from panics explain why market discipline alone will
not prevent panics and why the government cannot credibly commit not to
intervene in the event of a panic. Once government intervention becomes
inevitable, the question is one of form and timing. With respect to banks, the
classic source of fragility, the United States and other industrialized nations
have chosen to insure claims of a certain type up to a specified limit,
irrespective of whether a bank’s failure poses any stability risk.72 This broad
insurance scheme is coupled with extensive ex ante government regulation
and oversight to minimize the moral hazard and externalities.73 Ex ante

66. GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE THEM
COMING 5 (2012).
67. Id. at 8–9.
68. Id. at 6, 8–9, 46.
69. Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 43, at 253–54.
70. See Mark Carlson et al., The Demand for Short-Term, Safe Assets and Financial Stability:
Some Evidence and Implications for Central Bank Policies, INT’L J. CENT. BANKING, Dec. 2016, at
307, 309 (analyzing public and private short-term debt as substitutes); Arvind Krishnamurthy &
Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Short-Term Debt and the Financial Crisis: What We Can Learn from
U.S.
Treasury
Supply,
2–3
(Mar.
29,
2013)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/b5ed/7f384a3ee2205dc5fce2fc7fb028b0ad4823.pdf
[https://perma.cc/T6L2-2DBD] (showing that the aggregate amount of short-term debt issued by the
financial sector is inversely related to the aggregate amount of government debt outstanding).
71. Calomiris & Gorton, supra note 13, at 159 tbl.4.16 (providing evidence that at least one
failed bank was able to pay its depositors in full).
72. MICHAEL S. BARR ET AL., FINANCIAL REGULATION: LAW AND POLICY 233–36, 238–41,
255 (1st ed., 2016).
73. Id. at 247–52.
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regulation and supervision are only possible, however, when one can identify
in advance the institutions that could pose a threat to the stability of the
broader system.
When the site of fragility is outside the regulated banking sector, the
challenge shifts. Today’s system of market-based intermediation, like the
other shadow banking systems Rockoff, Gorton, and other economic
historians have examined, can play an important role in promoting economic
growth and harnessing new technology to facilitate financial intermediation.
Just as importantly, regardless of the social utility of financial intermediation
outside the regulated banking sector, history suggests it is inevitable. In light
of the significant new costs imposed on banks in the post-Crisis regime and
the ongoing viability of using contract and property to enable intermediation
outside that regime, there is no reason to think that shadow banking will
disappear.74 If anything, it seems poised for further growth.75 Recognizing
that financial regulators will necessarily remain behind the curve in
identifying these sources of fragility, and that they will often lack the
authority to subject new forms of intermediation to prudential regulation and
oversight, makes Bagehot’s admonition for flexibility just as relevant today.
It is also among the key virtues of institutionalizing a guarantor of last resort
in the form suggested here.76
E.

The EGA in Relation to Other Recent Proposals
The final dimension of comparison that merits attention is how the EGA
would compare with, and might complement, other proposals for trying to
tackle the challenges here at issue. Despite widespread attacks on the Federal
Reserve and other central banks for reasons outlined here and others, many
experts recognize that some change with respect to crisis management and
the role of the Fed in managing crises is warranted. There remains, however,
significant disagreement regarding the nature of the problem, the range of
viable alternatives, and thus how best to proceed. Paul Tucker, former Deputy
Director of the Bank of England, for example, has argued that Bagehot can
still work so long as central banks provide more clear advance guidance

74. There have been some notable improvements post-Crisis, like the creation of the Financial
Stability Oversight Council, its ability to designate non-banks systemically significant, and
fundamental changes in how money market mutual funds are regulated. These changes, however,
remain modest relative to the size of the shadow banking system, and the increased regulation of
banks increases the economic returns from shadow banking, setting the stage for further growth.
75. See FIN. STABILITY BD., GLOBAL SHADOW BANKING MONITORING REPORT 2016, at 3
(2017),
http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/global-shadow-banking-monitoring-report2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/94PB-HAH6] (stating that “shadow banking that may give rise to
financial stability risks grew 3.2% to $34 trillion in 2015 for the 27 jurisdictions” examined for the
report).
76. See infra subpart IV(D).
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regarding to whom they will lend and on what terms.77 Hal Scott has similar
ongoing faith in the capacity of a central bank with broad lender-of-last-resort
authority to stave off crisis and wants the Federal Reserve’s power to be
expanded accordingly, but he also recognizes the value of empowering
regulators to go further, providing guarantees and other forms of support,
without having to go to Congress.78 By contrast, others have argued for
reforms far more drastic than those proposed here, most of which leave a
central bank with a more central role in crisis management than the EGA
envisions. Former Director of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, has come
up with an innovative proposal to replace a traditional lender of last resort
with a pawnbroker of last resort, able to lend against assets that have been
prepositioned at a central bank.79 Professor Eric Posner has argued in favor
of giving central banks even more expansive authority to inject capital and
take other clearly fiscal action like recapitalizing banks.80 In a slightly
different but related vein, a number of scholars, like Morgan Ricks and Adam
Levitin, have proposed dramatic ex ante changes to the structure of finance
with the aim of eliminating even the possibility of panics.81
The arguments for adopting the EGA in lieu of, or potentially in
conjunction with, one of these other proposals vary and are laid out in greater
detail in connection with the proposal itself below.82 The three key
advantages of the EGA relative to most alternatives on the table are its
capacity to address financial dynamism, its ability to accommodate a more
realistic set of information assumptions, and its capacity to help promote
healthy democratic engagement.
Underlying the EGA is an assumption that ex ante regulation is critical,
but finance has a way of changing whether we want it to or not. Recognizing
that the financial system will inevitably evolve, and will do so in ways that
weaken the efficacy of rules meant to guard against panics, no matter how
well-conceived, suggests that the EGA will remain useful even in the event
that ex ante regulation becomes significantly more robust or policymakers

77. See generally PAUL TUCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN
CENTRAL BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE 503–24 (2018) (arguing for more rigidly
defined and communicated lending standards paired with better accountability for financing from
central banks).
78. SCOTT, supra note 29, at 137–45.
79. MERVYN KING, THE END OF ALCHEMY: MONEY, BANKING, AND THE FUTURE OF THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY 269–70 (2017).
80. ERIC POSNER, LAST RESORT: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE FUTURE OF BAILOUTS 177–
78 (2018); Posner, supra note 24, at 1570–71.
81. See RICKS, supra note 5, at 12–21 (promoting massive changes like the elimination of
physical currency, the conversion of banks to public–private partnerships, and a cap-and-trade
system for monetary issues); see also Levitin, supra note 6, at 357 (proposing the “Pure Reserve”
system where safe banks exist exclusively for safekeeping and payment services).
82. See infra Parts III, IV.
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adopt one of the other reform proposals on the table.83 Similarly, the various
forms of calls for a more robust lender of last resort are interesting and might
have some benefits if adopted. But their efficacy often hinges on the central
bank having high-quality information about which institutions are healthy
and what assets are worth, both issues that become difficult to discern during
periods of systemic distress.
Finally, the Article here is concerned with both the macroeconomic
ramifications of how one approaches crisis containment and the longer-term
legitimacy issues that arise. Approaches like those proposed by Scott, King
and Posner, while potentially offering benefits over the status quo, could
exacerbate the challenge of trying to protect central bank independence with
respect to monetary policy and may well increase the probability of political
backlash following a crisis.
The proposed EGA does not purport to solve financial fragility, nor
would it exclude any of the reforms just mentioned. It could in fact serve as
a useful complement to many of them. It would, however, shift the
implications of adoption, both in terms of minimizing the adverse costs of
unintended developments and in ensuring that there remains a politically
accountable body positioned to take the lead when things go badly.
II.

The Practice: Guarantees in the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis
When it comes to containing crises, theory often lags behind practice.
The Bank of England experimented, but inconsistently; Bagehot pointed out
what worked and what did not work in light of those experiences; these
observations then laid the foundation for his policy recommendation.
Another century passed before economists formally captured the dynamics
that explain why Bagehot was right to endorse lender-of-last-resort
interventions. Other popular forms of bank regulation, from deposit
insurance to capital-adequacy requirements, were similarly borne out of
experience more than theory.
Embracing the importance of learning from experience, this Part
explores the frequency with which guarantees are already used by
policymakers to contain financial crises. The focus is the response of U.S.
regulators to the Crisis through the passage of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008. Given the limited formal guarantee powers
enjoyed by regulators, this Part examines the practical intent and effect of the
interventions examined even when regulators had to stretch their formal
authority to achieve a desired aim.

83. See generally Judge, supra note 7, at 1173–75 (providing an alternative view of financial
crises, fragility, and regulation that contrasts with Ricks’s view and proposal).
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Guarantees in the Crisis

1. The FDIC.—Even outside of crisis periods, a primary role of the
FDIC is to assure smaller depositors that they will get their money back even
if their bank fails.84 This would remain unchanged under the proposal here.
During the Crisis, however, the FDIC provided a range of guarantees that
went well beyond its traditional role of insuring deposits up to the statutory
cap (which was increased to $250,000 per account during the Crisis).85 For
example, in October 2008, at the height of the Crisis, the FDIC adopted the
Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program.86 Because all of the entities
eligible to participate were already regulated banks with FDIC insurance and
the program was adopted pursuant to a “systemic risk” determination by the
Treasury Secretary,87 the FDIC was able to automatically enroll all eligible
banks in the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. This was actually two
initiatives bundled under a single heading, while providing eligible banks a
subsequent opportunity to opt out of one or both dimensions of the Program.88
The first component of the Program dramatically expanded the scope of
the short-term claims protected by the FDIC. Pursuant to this aspect of the
Program, the FDIC “guaranteed in full all domestic noninterest-bearing
transaction deposits” and certain other short-term claims at participating
banks.89 These additional guarantees covered more than $800 billion in
deposits at the program’s height in 2009, and a subsequent variation on the
program eventually covered more than $1.4 trillion in deposits.90
The second element of the program guaranteed banks’ newly issued debt
up to a prescribed amount set by reference to a bank’s outstanding debt

84. See 2018–2022 Strategic Plan: Insurance Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,
https://www.fdic.gov/about/strategic/strategic/insurance.html
[https://perma.cc/AZ6H-DBZT]
(emphasizing that the FDIC “protects depositors at banks and savings associations of all sizes”).
85. Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Basic FDIC Insurance Coverage Permanently
Increased to $250,000 Per Depositor (July 21, 2010) (on file with author).
86. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www.fdic.gov
/regulations/resources/tlgp/index.html [https://perma.cc/949Y-PAPQ] [hereinafter TLGP].
87. Lee Davison, The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk
Exception, in CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY 2008–2013, at 33, 34 (2017),
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/crisis-complete.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LRM-N96K].
88. Seth A. Hoelscher & Duane Stock, Was Bond Insurance a Gift from the FDIC? 1, 4–5
(Feb. 19, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), https://www.ou.edu/dam/price/Finance/CFS/paper/pdf/
StockHoelscherPaper.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GCU-JQXX]. For more detailed information, see
generally 12 C.F.R. § 370 (2009) (setting forth the criteria related to participation in the Temporary
Liquidity Guarantee Program).
89. TLGP, supra note 86 (emphasis added).
90. Davison, supra note 85a, at 33; Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Chairman
Bair Delivers Remarks to the Johns Hopkins Carey Business School: Discusses Imminent Board
Action to Finalize Rules on Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (Nov. 20, 2008) (on file with
author).
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scheduled to mature.91 The guarantee extended only until mid-2012, even if
the debt itself had a longer maturity.92 At its peak, the FDIC guaranteed
$345.8 billion in bank debt through this regime, as a wide range of banks
utilized the program.93
Fees were levied on all banks that remained in the deposit guarantee
program after the opportunity to opt-out and on the issuance of any new
bonds backed by an FDIC guarantee. The fees collected enabled the FDIC to
earn more than it lost in the aggregate.94 Nonetheless, both programs incurred
losses.95 The deposit guarantee aspect of the regime resulted in net losses.96
And, even though these were offset by net gains from the guarantees on
newly issued debt, subsequent empirical analysis suggests that the great
majority of banks using these programs enjoyed net benefits as a result,
suggesting this too operated, on the whole, as a subsidy to the participating
banks.97
These programs served complementary aims. Expanding deposit
insurance encouraged depositors to keep their money in banks, helping to
stabilize the banking system. A secondary effect may have been to reduce the
movement of deposits away from community banks and toward banks
perceived as too big to fail.98 The guarantees on the longer-term debt were
not aimed at preventing runs but rather at helping banks to manage new debt
as older debt matured. A common element of both schemes is that they
largely worked to keep private money in the system and to keep it where it
was prior to the Crisis.
2. The Federal Reserve.—Unlike the FDIC, the Federal Reserve had no
formal authority to insure short-term (or other) debt. Thus, to understand the
ways the Federal Reserve used effective guarantees to help stem the panic, it
is necessary to examine the aim and effect of its interventions, not just the
formal terms of those interventions.
One example of a Federal Reserve intervention that took the form of a
guarantee was the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual
91. 12 C.F.R. § 370.3(6) (2015).
92. Id. § 370.3(d).
93. TLGP, supra note 85.
94. Id. (stating that “[o]verall, TLGP fees exceeded the losses from the program” and providing
a breakdown of both).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Hoelscher & Stock, supra note 88, at 16–21.
98. Evan Weinberger, State Banking Groups Push Congress for TAG Extension, LAW360
(Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.law360.com/articles/374241/state-banking-groups-push-congressfor-tag-extension [https://perma.cc/LV8X-88FM] (explaining that “[s]maller banks argue that the
guarantees helped even the playing field when competing with their larger rivals,” and describing
efforts by groups representing community bank interests to extend the program).
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Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), put into place in September 2008.99 The
failure of Lehman Brothers caused one money market mutual fund to “break
the buck,” a term used when a fund’s net asset value falls below $1.00 per
share.100 Within a week, investors withdrew more than $170 billion from
money market funds, creating significant disruptions in short-term funding
markets.101 At the time, money market funds held roughly 45% of the
outstanding commercial paper.102 To help counter the lack of liquidity in the
market for asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and to make it easier for
money market mutual funds to unload such paper in order to pay all of the
money market fund holders who were demanding their money back, the Fed
launched the AMLF.103
The AMLF was adopted pursuant to the Federal Reserve’s authority
under Section 13(3), which enables it to serve as a lender of last resort to nonbank institutions under exceptional circumstances.104 The structure of the
AMLF deviated significantly from traditional lender-of-last-resort
operations. Pursuant to the AMLF, the Federal Reserve loaned money to
banks to buy ABCP from money market mutual funds.105 The loans were
made without any recourse to the bank that received the loan, and there was
no haircut, meaning that banks could borrow the full price they paid for the
ABCP.106 The terms thus operated in a manner akin to a Federal Reserve
guarantee of the full value of the ABCP posted even though the Federal
Reserve has no authority under Section 13(3) to provide guarantees and thus
could not formally guarantee the instruments.
Within ten days of its launch, the guarantees extended under the AMLF
exceeded $150 billion.107 Subsequent empirical analysis suggests that the

99. Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility, BD. OF
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., https://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy
/abcpmmmf.htm [https://perma.cc/3TAK-B4PT].
100. Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as
Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 STAN. J. L., BUS. & FIN. 131, 132 (2011).
101. Id. at 149.
102. Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., How Effective Were the Federal Reserve Emergency Liquidity
Facilities? Evidence from the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility, 68 J. FIN. 715, 722 (2013).
103. U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-696, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO
STRENGTHEN POLICIES AND PROCESSES FOR MANAGING EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE 154–57 app.II,
154 fig.14 (2011).
104. 12 U.S.C. § 343(3) (2012). As enacted by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 1101(c), 124 Stat. 1376, 2115 (2010), “any
reference in any provision of Federal law to the third undesignated paragraph of section 13 of the
Federal Reserve Act (12 U.S.C. 343) shall be deemed to be a reference to section 13(3) of the
Federal Reserve Act.”
105. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 101, at 156.
106. Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 102, at 724.
107. Id. at 723 fig.3.
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program succeeded in reducing the liquidity strains in the ABCP market and
the strains faced by money market mutual funds holding such assets.108
Subsequent analysis also suggests that the program made it easier for money
market funds to continue to buy ABCP, reducing the additional strain
imposed on the already strained credit markets.109 Like the loan to AIG, the
program experienced no losses and yielded significant fees for the Federal
Reserve.110 Use of the AMLF declined precipitously when it was superseded
by another program pursuant to which the Federal Reserve directly purchased
ABCP and other forms of commercial paper.111 The program was thus shortlived, but seemingly quite effective during its short life.
The support that the Federal Reserve provided to AIG to enable the firm
to avert filing for bankruptcy immediately after the failure of Lehman
Brothers was another instance of the Fed using its lender-of-last-resort
authority to effectively provide a guarantee. AIG was the second large
financial institution that the Federal Reserve helped keep out of bankruptcy
despite lacking the liquid assets required to keep its doors open.112 The first
was Bear Stearns. In March 2008, the Federal Reserve facilitated JP
Morgan’s acquisition of Bear Stearns by effectively enabling the transfer of
$30 billion in risky assets off of Bear’s balance sheet into a newly formed
entity funded with just over $1 billion from JP Morgan and nearly $29 billion
from the New York Fed.113 Although the Federal Reserve ultimately profited
from the transaction, it incurred significant credit risk in the interim and,
because the Federal Reserve intervention enabled Bear to avoid bankruptcy,
it has subsequently been viewed as a government bailout of the firm.114
In contrast to the situation with Bear Stearns, the AIG intervention was
structured to enable it to remain a stand-alone company. Pursuant to the

108. Id. at 717.
109. Burcu Duygan-Bump et al., supra note 100, at 722–23.
110. Id. at 723–24 (stating that “the Federal Reserve did not suffer any losses in its operation
of the AMLF,” which expired in February 2010).
111. MARC LABONTE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44185, FEDERAL RESERVE: EMERGENCY
LENDING 6, 26 (2016).
112. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 101, at 32–33.
113. MAIDEN LANE LLC, CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS AS OF AND FOR THE
YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2014 AND 2013, AND INDEPENDENT AUDITORS’ REPORT 7 (2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/maidenlanellcfinstmt2015_508.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2TYB-YLTD]; Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y.,
https:www.newyorkfed.org/markets/maidenlane.html [https://perma.cc/4XL4-S7AF].
114. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., supra note 113 (“June 14, 2012: Maiden Lane LLC . . .
repaid the loans made by the New York Fed, with interest.”); Net Portfolio Holdings of Maiden
Lane LLC, ALFRED, https://alfred.stlouisfed.org/series?seid=WMAIDEN1&utm_source=series
_page&utm_medium=related_content&utm_term=related_resources&utm_campaign=alfred
[https://perma.cc/5J4H-THMG], with the date range set to 2008-01-18 to the current date) (showing
that the value of the assets in the LLC declined significantly before rebounding, with the aggregate
portfolio value subsequently declining as a result of sales).
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initial agreement between the Federal Reserve and AIG, the Federal Reserve
agreed to provide up to $85 billion in fresh liquidity to AIG in exchange for
a 79.9% stake in the company along with other fees and interest.115 Critical
to the analysis here is that implicit in this $85 billion commitment was an
understanding that the government would provide AIG whatever support was
required to enable it to avert bankruptcy.116 The true guarantee-like scope of
the government’s commitment soon became apparent. When the initial
injection proved deficient to meet AIG’s ongoing liquidity needs, the Federal
Reserve, and subsequently the Treasury Department, ultimately disbursed
more than $184 billion to assist AIG—well more than twice the original
commitment.117
Although ultimately profitable, the transaction put the government in
the position of being AIG’s largest shareholder for a lengthy period of time
and exposed the government to significant credit risk. It was not until August
2009, “after posting a more than $100 billion loss over the previous six
quarters,” that AIG again became profitable.118 Subsequent analysis “of the
performance of AIG’s underlying real estate securities indicate[] that AIG’s
problems were not purely about liquidity,” and there were meaningful writedowns in the assets used as collateral for the Fed’s loans to AIG.119
More generally, although the AMLF, Bear, and AIG interventions were
all adopted under § 13(3), which is meant to enable the Federal Reserve to
serve as a lender of last resort to non-banks in “unusual and exigent
circumstances,” the forms of those interventions are as unusual as the
circumstances that prompted them.120 Not one of these interventions
resembled a traditional lender-of-last-resort intervention. Rather, consistent

115. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 856 F.3d 953, 959 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
116. It is possible that if the government had the authority to explicitly guarantee AIG’s
counterparties and other creditors, AIG’s liquidity needs might have been far more modest.
117. For a detailed description of the government support provided to AIG, see BAIRD WEBEL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42953, GOVERNMENT ASSISTANCE FOR AIG: SUMMARY AND COST 8
tbl.1, 9–17 app. A (2017). With respect to the support provided by the Treasury, see Calomiris &
Khan, supra note 37, at 62 (explaining that “any TARP investment in a too-big-to-fail bank had
always been an implicit contingent common stock investment” in that “[i]t was unlikely that the
government would use its preferred status in the states of the world where it would be financially
useful to do so (in bankruptcy or receivership) because the government would convert to common
stock in order to prevent bankruptcy or receivership”).
118. Financial Stability: TARP Tracker from November 2008 to September 2018, U.S. DEP’T
OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/TARPTracker.aspx [https://perma.cc/D9R8-A468] (under the “Timeline Events” column on the right,
scroll down to “August 2009”).
119. Robert McDonald & Anna Paulson, AIG in Hindsight, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2015, at
81, 103.
120. Parinitha Sastry, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., The Political Origins of Section 13(3) of
the Federal Reserve Act, ECON. POL’Y REV., Sept. 2018, at 1, 1–2, 3 tbl.1.
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with the analysis in Part I, they were effectively guarantees formally
structured otherwise because of legal constraints.
3. The Treasury.—The most striking example of the Treasury
Department’s use of guarantees during the Crisis was the support it provided
to money market mutual funds. In the same week that the Federal Reserve
launched the AMLF, and motivated by similar concerns regarding the
mounting withdrawals from prime money market mutual funds and the
potential ripple effects of those withdrawals, the Treasury Department
launched a temporary program to guarantee money market funds that opted
to participate in the program.121
The guarantees were provided using the Exchange Stabilization Fund
established by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934.122 That Fund was designed to
enable the treasury secretary to “deal in gold, foreign exchange, and other
instruments of credit and securities” in order to influence the relative value
of the U.S. dollar.123 The Fund had already moved “from obscurity to
notoriety,” in the words of Anna Schwartz, when used by the Treasury to
make a $12 billion loan to Mexico in 1995.124 The program extended the
guarantees on an opt-in basis; it provided coverage up to the value of the fund
on the day the program was launched—thus serving to maintain rather than
change the status quo; and it required participating funds to pay a fee in
exchange for coverage.125 The majority of mutual funds participated, leading
to the payment of well over $800 million in fees to the Treasury
Department.126 The government did not have to pay out on any of the
guarantees, as not a single money market fund failed while the program was
in place.127
Even though the government came out ahead financially, the episode
revealed that money market mutual funds pose systemic risk and might
require government support. With some prompting from the Financial
121. Asset Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP) Money Market Mutual Fund (MMMF) Liquidity
Facility (AMLF or “the Facility”), Fed. Reserve Discount Window/Payment System Risk (Feb. 5,
2010),
https://www.frbdiscountwindow.org/Archive/Asset-Backed-Commercial-Paper-ABCPMoney-Market-Mutual-Fund-MMMF-Liquidity-Facility-AMLF-or-the-Facility[https://perma.cc/E9AF-KG8D] (noting the AMLF program began operations on September 22,
2008); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Treasury Announces Temporary Guarantee
Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008).
122. Id.
123. 31 U.S.C. § 5302 (2012); see also Gary Richardson et al., Gold Reserve Act of 1934, FED.
RES. HIST. (Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/gold_reserve_act
[https://perma.cc/ZT6M-SZTX].
124. Anna J. Schwartz, From Obscurity to Notoriety: A Biography of the Exchange
Stabilization Fund, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 135, 135 (1997).
125. Macey, supra note 100, at 149–50.
126. Id. at 150.
127. Id.
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Stability Oversight Council, this revelation motivated the SEC to overhaul
how these funds are regulated.128 As then-SEC Chair Mary Jo White
explained when the new rules were finalized, the “reforms fundamentally
change the way that money market funds operate. They will reduce the risk
of runs in money market funds and provide important new tools that will help
further protect investors and the financial system.”129 Thus, when evaluating
the significance of the Treasury’s intervention from the perspective of the
money market mutual fund industry, the “strong reform package” imposed
on them after the Crisis was resolved was much more costly than the fees
they incurred to participate in the Treasury’s guarantee program.130
4. A Brief Look Abroad.—Given the diversity of different financial and
political systems, and the inherent challenges of scope, the focus here is on
the United States. But the claim is not specific to the U.S. system, and so it
is worth taking a moment to expand the lens. Following the failure of Lehman
Brothers, a number of countries, such as Australia, Denmark, Germany,
Hong Kong, New Zealand, and Singapore, expanded their deposit insurance
schemes to cover all retail deposits.131 An overlapping group of countries,
including Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United
Kingdom, also guaranteed banks’ wholesale sources of short-term funding.132
Ultimately, many of these countries provided significant explicit fiscal
support to their banking sectors in the form of recapitalizations and broader
guarantees.133 The point here is merely to highlight that within a short period
of time after the shock induced by Lehman’s failure, a good number of
countries introduced broad Crisis-era guarantees to help stabilize their
financial systems. That this mode of crisis-intervention was used so broadly
suggests that policymakers believed very broad guarantees to be helpful in
ways that went beyond the already institutionalized mechanisms for lenderof-last-resort support.
B.

Putting These Actions in Context

The array of interventions described above are too diverse and the
ramifications too contested to yield simple answers about how best to contain

128. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Adopts Money Market Fund Reform
Rules (July 23, 2014).
129. Id.
130. See id. (explaining that the new rules requiring use of a floating net asset value (NAV)
prevents funds from using the “special pricing and valuation conventions that currently permit them
to maintain a constant share price”).
131. Allen et al., supra note 9, at 33.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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a growing financial crisis. Collectively, however, they still shed light on a
number of key issues.
First, regulators already use guarantees to contain panics and stem the
spread of financial crises.134 Short-term creditors are the ones who can flee
most easily, and many of the interventions targeted them accordingly. But
interventions protecting longer term creditors were also used with some
frequency.135 All of the interventions had the aim and effect of reducing the
spread of the panic by keeping private capital in the system. By allowing
creditors to temporarily rely on the government’s creditworthiness in lieu of
having to worry about the actual value of the assets underlying their claims,
these interventions helped to stabilize and protect funding structures that had
been in place prior to the Crisis. In general, guarantees were used to reduce,
rather than bring about, changes in how assets were funded.
Second, these guarantees were needed because traditional lender-oflast-resort interventions proved helpful but far from sufficient in preventing
the panic from spreading. Starting in August 2007, more than a year before
the Crisis hit its zenith, the Federal Reserve launched a number of
lender-of-last-resort initiatives to try to stem its growth.136 Those
interventions made it easier for commercial banks to borrow from the Federal
Reserve while avoiding the stigma sometimes associated with discountwindow borrowing. Starting in March 2008, the Federal Reserve also
extended lender-of-last-resort support to many non-banks in recognition of
the growth and importance of market-based intermediation.137 These
interventions reduced liquidity strains, but they did not bring about a
meaningful and positive inflection point in the evolution of the Crisis until
complemented by more robust interventions.138
Third, as effective as these guarantees were at helping to stem the Crisis,
they too were stopgap measures. It was not until the underlying information
134. See id. at 32–38 (describing the use of guarantees in various countries); Luc Laeven &
Fabian Valencia, Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly 4–5 (Int’l
Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/10/146, 2010), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp
/2010/wp10146.pdf [https://perma.cc/V4UL-QE9C] (discussing “widespread use” of guarantees
and providing examples from different countries).
135. See Sebastian Schich, Expanded Guarantees for Banks: Benefits, Costs and Exit Issues,
2009 OECD J: FIN. MKT. TRENDS, no. 2, at 55, 59 (describing government-intervention targeting
of longer-term funding in financial turmoil).
136. For a detailed account of the Fed’s actions during this time, see Judge, supra note 17, at
55–58. For a summary of the research, which generally shows that these interventions had beneficial
effects, see Frederic S. Mishkin, Over the Cliff: From the Subprime to the Global Financial Crisis,
J. ECON. PERSP. (Spring 2011), at 49, 60–61.
137. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE’S SECTION
13(3) LENDING FACILITIES TO SUPPORT OVERALL MARKET LIQUIDITY: FUNCTION, STATUS, AND
RISK MANAGEMENT 17 (2010), https://oig.federalreserve.gov/reports/FRS_Lending_Facilities
_Report_final-11-23-10_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/T3BA-PL9E].
138. Judge, supra note 12, at 919–20.
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gaps and capital deficiencies that contributed to the panic were addressed that
the liquidity strains fully dissipated and markets began to function without
government support.139 The required recapitalizations were possible only
because of explicit congressional authorization, granted at the height of the
Crisis with strikingly little information.140
Fourth, expanding the scope of the analysis, the need to go to Congress
at the height of the Crisis exacerbated the Crisis and did little to enhance the
democratic accountability issues posed by the extraordinary interventions
required to stabilize the financial system. The Crisis had been underway for
more than a year before policymakers sought this additional authority from
Congress.141 Nonetheless, congressional leaders were largely unaware that a
crisis of such magnitude had been brewing.142 Moreover, when regulators
sought this new authority, the Treasury Department and other financial
policymakers still lacked critical information about the source of the
problems and how best to address them.143 One ramification was that the
House of Representatives initially voted down a bill to provide the Treasury
Secretary additional authority, significantly exacerbating the Crisis.144
Another consequence was that the Treasury Department requested, and
Congress provided, authority to pursue an asset purchase plan that was never
actually implemented. Instead, the Treasury creatively interpreted its
authority to buy troubled assets as enabling it to provide fresh capital to AIG,

139. See, e.g., BEN S. BERNANKE, THE COURAGE TO ACT: A MEMOIR OF A CRISIS AND ITS
AFTERMATH 567–75 (2015) (describing the role of transparency and higher liquid asset holding
requirements had on American recovery); Judge, supra note 12, at 909–11 (noting the results of the
Supervisory Capital Assessment Program disseminated information on bank health, which reduced
uncertainty and promoted market activity); Mishkin, supra note 134, at 61–63 (identifying the
information provided by the stress tests as “[a] key element in the financial market recovery”).
140. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3766
(2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)) (identifying the purposes and broad powers granted
under the Act); Judge, supra note 12, at 907 (“With the adoption of the Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008 . . . Congress provided financial regulators with significant additional
tools . . . .”).
141. Judge, supra note 12, at 912.
142. See BERNANKE, supra note 139, at 284–85 (describing the meeting at which Bernanke and
Paulson warned Congress of the magnitude of what was happening).
143. Id.; John Cassidy, Anatomy of a Meltdown: Ben Bernanke and the Financial Crisis, NEW
YORKER (Dec. 1, 2008), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/12/01/anatomy-of-ameltdown [https://perma.cc/LM73-PRC7].
144. Mishkin, supra note 136, at 54–55; Liaquat Ahamed on Lehman Brothers’ Fall,
NEWSWEEK (May 17, 2009), http://www.newsweek.com/liaquat-ahamed-lehman-brothers-fall80127 [https://perma.cc/DT66-2NND] (noting that the Dow Jones Industrial average fell by only
2.5% in the two weeks following Lehman’s failure in contrast with a decline of nearly 25% in the
two weeks following the House’s no vote as evidence that the vote played a greater role than
Lehman’s failure in contributing to the fallout that followed).
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all of the largest banks, smaller weak banks, auto companies, and others.145
Although the capital infusions proved effective, the stark contrast between
the plan presented to Congress in seeking new authority and the plan
ultimately implemented by Treasury and other regulators renders laughable
the notion that Congress played a meaningful role in shaping the approach
pursued. Although this is but one example of the “unorthodox lawmaking”
that has become the new norm in congressional action,146 it starkly illustrates
how the need to act quickly in the face of an emergency can deprive Congress
of the chance to play a meaningful role in determining the appropriate
response to a crisis, such as the conditions that should attach to any capital
injections or other government support.147
Fifth, the lack of adequate tools to address the evolving Crisis
contributed to regulators’ willingness to stretch the authority that they did
have. The Treasury’s creative interpretation of the authority granted to it
under EESA was consistent with the behavior of all of the leading financial
regulators during the Crisis. Facing widespread panic, the Fed, the Treasury,
and the FDIC each proved willing to stretch its authority to provide the
guarantees here described. Congress noticed both this creativity and the
public backlash these interventions engendered. When the Crisis subsided,
Congress scaled back each of these sources of authority: The Fed, for
example, is forbidden from using its Section 13(3) authority to help
individual institutions, as it did with AIG and Bear, and it must overcome
new hurdles, like receiving approval from the Treasury Secretary, before
extending any loans under Section 13(3).148 The FDIC similarly faces new
limits on its authority to provide guarantees during periods of systemic
distress, including a requirement that two-thirds of the members of the
governing bodies of the FDIC and Federal Reserve determine that “failure to
take action would have serious adverse effects on financial stability or
economic conditions in the United States” and certain other conditions are
satisfied.149 These developments may in part reflect a lack of appreciation for
the need for crisis-fighting tools, but the fact that these sources of authority
145. BAIRD WEBEL & EDWARD V. MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL34730, THE
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT AND RECENT FINANCIAL TURMOIL: ISSUES AND
ANALYSIS 9–11 (2009).
146. Abbe R. Gluck et al., Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 1789, 1791–96 (2015) (providing an overview of the numerous ways that unorthodox
lawmaking has taken hold and the implications for where power lies in the lawmaking process).
147. This about-face did trigger congressional backlash. Representative Gary Ackerman, a
Democrat from New York, told Treasury Secretary Paulson at a hearing in November 2008: “You
seem to be flying a seven-hundred-billion-dollar plane by the seat of your pants.” Cassidy, supra
note 143.
148. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 1101(a)(6), 124 Stat. 1376, 2113–14 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 343 (2012)).
149. Id. § 1104(a)(2)(b)(ii), 124 Stat. 1376, 2120 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 5611(a)(2)(b)(ii) (2012)); id. §§ 1104–1106, 124 Stat. at 2120–26 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5611–
13 (2012)).
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were generally subjected to additional procedural burdens rather than
eliminated entirely suggests that concerns about accountability and
legitimacy were also at the forefront of the reasons for scaling back.
III. The Proposal: The EGA
Having established why having a robust LOLR does not suffice to deter
or stop panics, and that federal regulators have already adopted a de facto
policy of using the tools they do have to provide guarantees to limit the spread
of market dysfunction when a crisis hits, the Article now turns to the
normative claim that this de facto practice should be formalized. This Part
describes how the EGA would work and compares it, briefly, to the various
guarantees deployed during the Crisis. Parts IV and V address the virtues of
the proposed regime, the rationales for its precise contours, and the
challenges that may arise if it is adopted.
The Orderly Liquidation Authority, which authorizes the Treasury
Secretary to instigate an FDIC-controlled resolution of a non-bank financial
institution and to provide liquidity to facilitate that resolution, serves as a
rough template, although there are meaningful differences between the two.
Also worth noting is that the EGA could serve as an important complement
to other crisis-management and resolution tools, like having a robust lender
of last resort and the current Orderly Liquidation Authority, but it could also
serve as a partial substitute for these crisis-fighting tools. Given the Fed’s
already diminished authority to provide emergency liquidity, the scaling back
of other crisis-management tools, and the proposals to further reduce
regulators’ crisis-era toolkit, this partial substitutability may make adoption
of the EGA particularly timely and important.
A.

The EGA in a Nutshell
(1) In order to invoke its authority under the EGA, the Treasury
Secretary, in consultation with the President, must determine that the
situation poses a threat to the stability of the U.S. financial system and that
other conditions regarding the expected benefits of government intervention
and the lack of readily available private alternatives are satisfied.
(2) The Secretary can instigate consideration of whether the requisite
conditions are satisfied on his own initiative. He can also be compelled to
make such a determination upon receipt of a written recommendation
approved by the majority of the leadership of any of the major financial
regulators (namely, the Federal Reserve, OCC, FDIC, SEC or CFTC).
(3) The scope and structure of the EGA—including eligible entities and
claims and the terms of the guarantees provided—will be determined by the
Treasury Secretary, in consultation with other regulators as appropriate, in
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light of the circumstances confronted. The features that may be incorporated
include:150
a. An opt-in regime that assesses a fee from the entity issuing the
claims protected in exchange for such protection.
b. A mandatory program that provides direct and automatic
protection for a specified class of claimants while imposing no formal
requirements on the entities issuing the claims.
c. A negotiated regime in which entities have the option to participate
in exchange for providing information, undertaking internal
risk-management changes or agreeing to other terms.
d. A limit on the aggregate coverage established by reference to the
value of the claims outstanding at the time of intervention, or a comparable
cap designed to ensure that the guarantees operate to maintain, rather than
change, the status quo.
e. Limits with respect to the particular claims, enabling the
guarantees to cover the full-face amount of the debt protected or some lesser
portion thereof.
f. Additionally, the Treasury Department would have the option, but
not obligation, to adopt guidelines in advance of any crisis, such as a
guideline providing that it would not intervene to prevent the failure of a
single institution, but it may provide widespread support in the wake of such
a failure.
(4) The Secretary has the option to work with other financial regulators
in establishing the terms and operationalizing an intervention. The Secretary
may further use her position as head of the FSOC to facilitate the
communication and coordination required to achieve desired aims.
(5) The Secretary’s otherwise quite significant discretion is subject to
two limitations:
a. Invocation of the EGA is subject to a two-year time limit.
Guarantees may be shorter in duration, but they cannot be longer, and all
guarantees will expire two years after the EGA is first invoked even if a
particular guarantee is not issued until later in the Crisis.
b. Once the EGA is invoked to protect a set of claimants, it cannot
again be used to protect the same class of claimants unless Congress has
expressly reauthorized the Secretary to provide such protection.
(6) Reports to Congress.
a. Shortly after making a determination regarding whether to invoke
the EGA, the Secretary must report to Congress regarding its determinations

150. Many of these features are derived from the experience of using guarantees in the Crisis.
See supra Part II. Others build on a theory regarding how best to limit moral hazard while still
promoting financial resilience. See infra Part IV.
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and the reasons therefore. The Secretary must provide Congress regular
updates regarding any guarantee program implemented.
b. Within one year of first invoking the EGA, the Secretary would
provide a report to Congress on (a) the reasons why invoking the EGA had
been necessary; (b) whether the circumstances giving rise to the invocation
had been resolved; (c) whether further action is needed to address ongoing
threats to the stability of the financial system and what course of action the
Secretary would recommend to address those threats; and, (d) if no further
action is required to bring about stability, what reforms have been
implemented or ought to be implemented to prevent a recurrence of the
circumstances leading to the invocation of the EGA. Any other financial
regulator who had played a role in invoking or implementing the EGA would
be asked to sign onto the Secretary’s report or explain how its assessment
diverged from that contained in the report. One six-month extension could be
invoked with good reason given for the delay.
c. Congress can determine whether to hold oversight hearings, empower
an Inspector General to review the actions taken, or take other steps to assess
the appropriateness of the Secretary’s actions. Congress would separately
take up, as needed, consideration of any legislation required to address the
lingering crisis or to facilitate reforms needed to address newly revealed
sources of systemic risk. Alternatively, Congress could set up a special
commission or put into place an alternative structure for developing an
appropriate response to the challenges revealed.
B.

Comparing the EGA to Past Practice

To understand the impact of adopting the EGA, it is useful to consider
how the presence of this authority would impact the handling of an actual
financial crisis. Although speculative, this subpart briefly considers
(i) whether and to what extent the EGA would have enabled the types of
interventions regulators used in response to the Crisis, including actions
taken pursuant to legal authority that have since been scaled back; and
(ii) other ways that having the EGA in place may have altered the nature and
significance of these and other interventions.
1. Scope of Coverage.—Many of the guarantees used during the Crisis
could have been implemented pursuant to the EGA. For example, the
guarantees extended to money market mutual funds and noninterest-bearing
transaction deposits could have been adopted on substantially the same terms,
subject to the explicit two-year time limit and other checks. Something akin
to the Federal Reserve’s AMLF also would have been possible.
The EGA could also be used to guarantee longer term or newly issued
debt, as the FDIC did during the Crisis. Although the EGA is designed
primarily to stop runs by short-term creditors, the range of creditors it may
protect is not proscribed. Just as the FDIC recognized, enabling an institution
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to retain longer term debt can also help calm a panic by protecting an
institution’s overall funding structure. The need for the Treasury Secretary to
authorize the terms of such loans, the reporting requirements, and the strict
two-year time limit for the guarantees would preclude an exact replica of the
FDIC’s program under the EGA, reflecting the additional checks the EGA
seeks to impose.151 But the EGA could use the FDIC program as a model for
how to use guarantees to help institutions attract new capital when longer
term debt matures.
The decisions made with respect to saving individual firms, such as Bear
Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG, brings to the fore the differences
between a world with the EGA and that which existed during the Crisis. On
one hand, there would be no question regarding the authority of the Treasury
Secretary to help avert the failure of an institution. Given that the leading
regulators all cited lack of legal authority as the reason for not intervening to
protect Lehman and that regulators grappled with their legal authority at other
points, this clarity would have been a meaningful shift.152 On the other hand,
the need for the Treasury Secretary to take the lead authorizing such
interventions, along with the other differences, may result in very different
terms. Additionally, the triggering of the two-year time limit for any
guarantees and the need to provide a comprehensive report regarding that
decision would likely result in very different types of behavior following a
decision to intervene.
Although it is impossible to know how the last crisis would have played
out in the presence of the EGA, a little speculation can bring to life the nature
of how the EGA stacks up against the pre-Crisis regime. First, in March 2008,
the Secretary would have faced a difficult decision with respect to whether
to save Bear. Knowing that he had broad authority to provide market-wide
support should things turn out badly may have increased the Treasury
Secretary’s willingness to take the risk of allowing Bear to fail. Given that
the overall financial system was stronger in March 2008 than it was in
September 2008 when Lehman failed, and the capacity of the Secretary to
step in to combat uncertainty, this may have resulted in a very different and

151. See infra section IV(C)(1).
152. See BERNANKE, supra note 137, at 302–04 (discussing the need for a plan to be politically
feasible, and a plan that “looked like a government takeover of banks” would be rejected by House
Republicans fearing an expansion of authority); HENRY M. PAULSON, JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE
THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 225 (2010) (admitting the
Federal Reserve did not have the statutory power to save Lehman Brothers, but that such an
admission would have devastated the economy); Public Policy Issues Raised by the Report of the
Lehman Bankruptcy Examiner: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 111th Cong. 15–17
(2010) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.)
(stating that no agency had the legal authority to provide the capital or unsecured guarantee that
may have prevented Lehman’s failure).

JUDGE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

742

3/31/19 1:37 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 97:707

smaller crisis.153 Alternatively, had he decided to save Bear, that decision
would have triggered the clock, setting a deadline for further guarantees and
imposing a range of reporting requirements. Although it is very difficult to
know, these constraints may have enhanced the preparedness of regulators
(and perhaps even Congress and market participants) for the eventual demise
of Lehman Brothers. And should Lehman’s demise still have materialized,
the Treasury Secretary again would have had additional options, and the
additional accountability, the EGA allows and imposes. The Secretary could
have used the EGA to help Lehman avert bankruptcy, but he also could have
used it to reduce the systemic disruptions of that bankruptcy by using
guarantees to deter counterparties and other short-term creditors from
running on Lehman and its subsidiaries.154
2. Decision-Making and Accountability.—Shifting the focus beyond the
form of intervention to the dynamics surrounding adoption and
implementation brings into relief what would, and would not, have been
different had the EGA been in place. As an initial matter, despite the apparent
diversity of actors involved in extending guarantees during the Crisis, making
the Secretary alone responsible for invoking the EGA seems like a major
shift.
The degree of the change this would bring about may, however, be more
modest than it first appears. The Treasury Secretary was deeply involved in
most of the guarantee-related actions that occurred during the Crisis. For
example, even under the law then in place, the FDIC could not have provided
any of the exceptional guarantees that it did without the Treasury Secretary
first making a systemic risk determination.155 Although the law did not give
the Treasury similar authority with respect to the Federal Reserve’s formal
authority to take action pursuant to Section 13(3), inside accounts make clear
that the Federal Reserve would not have provided support to Bear or AIG had
153. For a discussion of the additional actions that could have been taken during this period to
reduce the magnitude of the Crisis that followed, see generally Judge, supra note 12.
154. The importance of the EGA as a complement to changes in the bankruptcy code is reflected
in the critical role of the liquidity provided by short-term claimants in enabling the process to
proceed smoothly. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, How to Prevent Hard Cases from
Making Bad Law: Bear Stearns, Delaware, and the Strategic Use of Comity, 58 EMORY L.J. 713,
740 (2009) (showing that the Fed and J.P. Morgan’s commitment to purchase $30 billion of illiquid
Bear Stearns securities stabilized its share price); Mark J. Roe & David Skeel, Assessing the
Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MICH. L. REV. 727, 728–29 (2010) (discussing the role of the
government’s infusion of cash to facilitate the Chrysler chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding).
Adoption of the EGA, however, is far from a complete substitute for the Orderly Liquidation
Authority, which has a number of additional features that enhance its capacity to facilitate a more
orderly and accountable resolution process.
155. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(G) (2008); Deposit Insurance Regulations; Unlimited Coverage
for Noninterest-bearing Transaction Accounts, 75 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,342 (proposed Sept. 30,
2010) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 330) (supplementary information).
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the Treasury Secretary not approved.156 Moreover, economically, it was the
Treasury that bore much of the risk of the Fed’s unusual interventions.
Because the Fed routinely remits any excess profits it earns to the Treasury,
any diminution in its earnings reduces the size of the remit.157
The backstop provided to Bear Stearns illustrates these dynamics.
Subsequent disclosures make it clear that even though the Treasury Secretary
publicly ascribed the decision to the Fed, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
was involved throughout.158 Moreover, in a letter to New York Fed President
Timothy Geithner, he expressly acknowledged that
[o]n behalf of the Department of the Treasury, I support this action . . .
and acknowledge that if any loss arises out of the special facility
extended by the [Federal Reserve Bank of New York] to [J.P. Morgan
Chase], the loss will be treated . . . as an expense that may reduce the
net earnings transferred by the [New York Fed] to the Treasury
general fund.159
Thus, not only are guarantees widely used already in practice, but the
proposal to require the Secretary to make the appropriate findings to invoke
the EGA and to bear the associated credit risk may also be viewed as largely
formalizing a regime that already exists in practice. That the EGA expressly
contemplates that other financial regulators will often play a central role in
operationalizing guarantees further suggests that institutionalizing the EGA
may do more to affirm than disrupt the system in place when future crises hit.
But there remains a reasonable probability that formalization could be
transformative along a number of fronts. As a starting point, the EGA
provides clear lines of responsibility in conjunction with providing authority.
There would no longer be—as was the case with Lehman Brothers—an
option for regulators to hide behind a lack of legal authority when making a
decision not to intervene. Moreover, having a single regulator (the Treasury
Secretary) accountable for decisions to intervene and decisions not to
156. BERNANKE, supra note 139, at 216, 285.
157. Jane Ihrig et al., How Does the Fed Adjust Its Securities Holdings and Who Is Affected?
14 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2017-099, 2017), https://www
.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017099pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4Q6-GZF3].
158. Cf. Greg Robb, Treasury Details Key Role in Bear Stearns Bailout, MARKETWATCH
(Apr. 2, 2008), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/correct-treasury-details-extensive-role-in-bearstearns-bailout [https://perma.cc/822H-QC8X] (explaining that “Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson
and the White House, through its spokesmen, have taken to calling the Bear Stearns bailout a
‘Federal Reserve action’”), with Letter from Kevin I. Fromer, Assistant Sec. Legislative Affairs,
Dep’t. Treasury, to Russ Sullivan, Staff Dir., Democratic Staff, Comm. on Fin. & Kolan Davis,
Staff Dir., Republican Staff, Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 28, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/public/resources
/documents/Treasuryletter0308.pdf [https://perma.cc/C93A-P4FU] (stating that “Treasury
personnel, [including Secretary Paulson], worked closely with [the Federal Reserve] as it negotiated
with JPMorgan and Bear Stearns”).
159. Letter from Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec., Dep’t Treasury, to Timothy F. Geithner, Pres.,
Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y. (Mar. 17, 2008).
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intervene might result in meaningful changes in how these issues are handled
within the executive branch. Thus, even when the EGA would restore aspects
of the crisis-fighting toolkit that Congress took away post-Crisis, it would do
so in a manner that enhances accountability and could alter use accordingly.
The Treasury Secretary’s capacity to invoke the EGA is also likely to
have a significant impact on the behavior of other financial regulators during
periods of systemic distress. Financial regulators regularly stretched the
bounds of their legal authority during the Crisis, and notable scholars and at
least one court have taken the position that they violated the law on more than
one occasion.160 They did so, at least in part, because no one had the tools
needed to effectively bring an end to the successive runs that were spreading
throughout the system, and the specter of the Great Depression loomed large
as a reminder of what can happen when the government is too slow to
intervene.161 In a regime with the EGA, other regulators may be far less
inclined toward such creativity and could be more easily disciplined should
they exercise it nonetheless.
In addition to its power, the limits to what the EGA can accomplish are
also critical to understanding what makes the EGA useful in seeking the
middle ground along the many tensions at stake in the handling of a crisis. It
allows the executive branch to intervene quickly and forcefully to bring a
temporary reprieve, but it retains an important role for Congress. The
Treasury must report to Congress and, more importantly, the Treasury must
seek approval from Congress before taking more substantive fiscal action, as
will likely be needed to bring about lasting stability. The EGA thus integrates
concerns about political and public accountability into the
crisis-management regime and harnesses these forces to help address
challenges like moral hazard, rather than pretending that there can be such a
thing as a purely technocratic solution to the messy and difficult tradeoffs
crises inevitably pose.
This very brief analysis of the ways in which the EGA both enables and
imposes checks on the processes and terms of government guarantees as a
means for crisis management sets the stage for a more comprehensive
examination of the benefits, and some drawbacks, of the proposal. The next
two Parts address each in turn.

160. Starr Int’l Co. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 374, 378 (2012), vacated in part on different
grounds, 856 F.3d 953 (Fed. Cir. 2017); Posner, supra note 24, at 1548–53; Philip Hamburger, The
Raid on AIG’s Equity Was Illegal, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/theraid-on-aigs-equity-was-illegal-1520552723 [https://perma.cc/5LU5-79RG]; George Selgin, The
Courage to Refuse, ALT-M BLOG (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.alt-m.org/2015/10/31/courage-torefuse/ [https://perma.cc/U5AH-HS55].
161. Posner, supra note 24, at 1546.

JUDGE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

3/31/19 1:37 PM

Guarantor of Last Resort

745

IV. Some Benefits
A.

Stopping the Run While Starting the Clock

The core aim of the EGA is to stop a panic while simultaneously starting
the clock. The overarching need when a panic sets in—as they have,
regularly, in diverse countries throughout time162—is to stop the panic. There
are numerous theories about why short-term creditors run, some of which
focus on coordination problems among those creditors and others which
focus on what those creditors know about the health of the institutions issuing
their claims.163 Only government-backed guarantees can stop a panic
irrespective of which theory explains a particular run.164 This helps to explain
why deposit-insurance schemes have been so successful in helping to prevent
panics165 and why such schemes were generally expanded during the
Crisis.166 And it helps to explain why guarantees were used so extensively
and in so many different forms at the height of the Crisis. The programs
adopted varied dramatically, and thus had quite different benefits and costs.
Each, however, illustrates how guarantees can be used to keep private capital
in the system and reduce the magnitude of the ripples that spread when a
shock causes short-term creditors to have questions about the value of the
assets underlying their claims or the inclination of their fellow creditors to
flee. The value of a tool that can credibly stop short-term creditors from
running, irrespective of where in the system problems erupt, is hard to
overstate.
Nearly as important as providing a short-term reprieve from the
devastation a widespread panic can wreak, however, is ensuring that the
underlying problems giving rise to the panic are addressed. In addition to
demonstrating that panics inevitably arise, history also suggests that
regulators are often too slow to recognize and address the underlying
challenges, opting instead to forebear and hope the problem goes away. One
of the most vivid illustrations of this type of response is the way policymakers
at all levels responded to the savings and loan debacle of the 1980s. Even
putting to the side the adverse effects on GNP and other indirect costs, the
162. GORTON, supra note 66, at tbl.10.5; CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 112–16 (2009).
163. See supra subpart I(B).
164. Id.
165. E.g., RICKS, supra note 5, at 215–19.
166. Asli Demirgüç-Kunt et al., Introduction to the Updated Deposit Insurance Database,
VOX, CEPR POLICY PORTAL (Aug. 4, 2014), http://voxeu.org/article/updated-deposit-insurancedatabase [https://perma.cc/N4C4-QEDX] (finding a marked increase in the number of countries
with explicit deposit insurance schemes—of the 189 countries studied, “112 (59%) had explicit
deposit insurance by year-end 2013—a sharp increase from 84 countries (44%) in 2003. The great
financial crisis of 2008 influenced this trend, with 5 countries adopting deposit insurance in that
year alone”).
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process of closing failed institutions ultimately cost approximately $153
billion, of which $124 billion was borne by taxpayers.167 Subsequent
empirical work shows that regulators consistently delayed the closure of
institutions even when they were insolvent, and that these delays significantly
increased the costs of closing the institutions.168 Subsequent work also
highlights the massive secondary effects of the failure to close institutions in
a timely fashion, including losses to GNP stemming from the misallocation
of resources and increased funding costs for the government.169 Even more
recent work exploits heterogeneity across states to show that greater levels of
forbearance are correlated, initially, with more lending but eventually lead to
greater declines in credit, real estate prices, and growth when forbearance is
brought to an end.170
The tendency toward forbearance, however, is much more widespread
and consistently quite costly. Another famous example is Japan’s banking
crisis in the 1990s and the country’s prolonged challenges achieving growth
following that crisis.171 Recent work formally shows how deposit insurance
and regulatory forbearance can lead to financial crises and retard growth, and
maps the model onto Japan’s actions and challenges during this period.172
167. Timothy Curry & Lynn Shibut, The Cost of the Savings and Loan Crisis: Truth and
Consequences, FDIC BANKING REV., Dec. 2000, at 26, 33. For a description of some of the other
costs, see CONG. OF THE U.S. BUDGET OFFICE, THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE SAVINGS & LOAN
CRISIS 29–40 (1992); James B. Thomson, The Cost of Buying Time: Lessons from the Thrift
Debacle, ECON. COMMENT., FED. RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND, Jan. 1, 1993, at 1, 2–3.
168. E.g., Thomson, supra note 165, at 4 (providing a summary of the various empirical studies
conducted on the direct and indirect costs of regulatory forbearance during the S&L debacle and
concluding that “losses on [the thrifts] that have been forced to close their doors significantly
eclipsed the cost of prompt closure in the early years of the decade”); Edward J. Kane & Min-Teh
Yu, How Much Did Capital Forbearance Add to the Tab for the FSLIC Mess? 16 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4701, 1994), http://www.nber.org/papers/w4701.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EVB4-6BHL] (showing that forbearance increased costs even if one also takes
into account the potential benefits associated with the strategy).
169. CONG. OF THE U.S. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 165, at 33 (examining the adverse effects
on GNP); John B. Shoven et al., Real Interest Rates and the Savings and Loan Crisis: The Moral
Hazard Premium, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1992, at 155, 159–67 (describing the way and
demonstrating how competition from CDs issued by insolvent banks may have increased the yield
demanded from Treasuries).
170. SEAN HUNDTOFTE, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., DOES GOING EASY ON DISTRESSED
BANKS HELP ECONOMIC GROWTH?, STAFF REPORT NO. 823, at 1–2 (2017),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/staff_reports/sr823.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E6NP-UCAL] (finding that “forbearance is associated with larger contractions in
real estate[] and cumulative average declines of more than 3% in real GDP”).
171. E.g., Akihiro Kanaya & David Woo, The Japanese Banking Crisis of the 1990s: Sources
and Lessons, ESSAYS INT’L ECON., June 2001, at 1, 1 (explaining that “most of [the] underlying
causes” of Japan’s banking crisis, including “regulatory forbearance when the system is under
stress[,] are typical of banking crises in general”).
172. Robert Dekle & Kenneth Kletzer, Deposit Insurance Regulatory Forbearance and
Economic Growth: Implications for the Japanese Banking Crisis 10–15, 21–25 (Int’l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/05/169, 2005), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues
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There is also new evidence regarding the practice and determinants of
forbearance in Europe.173 Moreover, while the practice of forbearance did not
make U.S. headlines during the Crisis as it did during the S&L debacle, it
continues to be a real challenge. A recent study estimates that over a third of
the costs that the FDIC incurred in closing failed banks between 2007 and
2014 could have been avoided had the FDIC closed the institutions in a more
timely fashion.174 Qualitative analysis of the period similarly suggests that
regulators were too slow to act on the signals the market was sending and
that there is at least a possibility that the depths of the Crisis may have been
averted by a more timely regulatory response.175
More importantly, forbearance is merely one manifestation of a broader
dynamic. When a financial crisis erupts because of underlying problems
somewhere in the system, the long-term impact of that crisis will depend on
whether the underlying problems are addressed and treated in a timely
fashion or whether policymakers instead treat only the symptoms, allowing
the underlying problems to fester and grow. All too often, the latter course
prevails, adding to the size and cost of the crisis that ensues.176
The EGA is structured to minimize the capacity of policymakers to take
such an approach. It is a crisis management device, not a mechanism for
preventing or solving crises. The two-year time limit is sufficiently long to
enable deployment to have the desired effect of calming a panic, but it is also
not so long that it can serve as anything more than a stopgap measure.
Because the clock starts the moment the EGA is invoked, policymakers and
market participants are aware that they must move expeditiously to
understand and address whatever problems might resurface when the
guarantee ends.177

/2016/12/31/Deposit-Insurance-Regulatory-forbearance-and-Economic-Growth-Implications-forthe-Japanese-17825 [https://perma.cc/ZE25-TBM4].
173. Timotej Homar et al., What Drives Forbearance–Evidence from the ECB Comprehensive
Assessment 2 (Eur. Cent. Bank, Working Paper No. 1860, 2016), https://www.econstor.eu/handle
/10419/154293 [https://perma.cc/Z832-TFD2].
174. Rebel A. Cole & Lawrence J. White, When Time Is Not on Our Side: The Costs of
Regulatory Forbearance in the Closure of Insolvent Banks, J. BANKING & FIN., July 2017, at 235,
235–36.
175. Judge, supra note 12, at 913–15.
176. E.g., Takeo Hoshi & Anil K. Kashyap, Will the U.S. and Europe Avoid a Lost Decade?
Lessons from Japan’s Postcrisis Experience, 63 IMF ECON. REV. 110, 114–17 (2015) (suggesting
that certain European countries may be on a path of lower growth because of a failure to address
deficiencies in their banking sectors); Harry Huizinga & Luc Laeven, Bank Valuation and
Accounting Discretion During a Financial Crisis, 106 J. FIN. ECON. 614, 632–33 (2012); Judge,
supra note 17, at 65; Ricardo J. Caballero et al., Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in
Japan 1972 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12129, 2006).
177. For further discussion, see infra subparts IV(C), IV(D).
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B.

Time
The fine balance between granting regulators sufficient authority and
discretion to effectively stop a panic while not giving them so much
discretion that they can avoid confronting the challenges at hand can be
framed as an effort to provide regulators (as well as market participants and
other policymakers) one key ingredient: time.
Returning to the three explanations for a panic shows the value of time
in resolving a panic.178 If the challenge is coordination problems among
short-term creditors arising from the fact that early exit is rewarded and late
exit is penalized once a run takes hold, time itself may suffice to bring about
a cure. If the challenge is information asymmetries between the management
of institutions and the short-term creditors funding those institutions, time
might allow healthy institutions, on their own or with a third party, to devise
ways to credibly communicate that health to creditors. If the challenge is one
of information gaps, time can enable market participants and policymakers
to undertake the information gathering and analysis needed to fill the most
critical gaps. And, in the likely event that all three reasons are contributing,
time can help in each of these ways.
Starting with realistic assumptions about expertise, information, and
ignorance helps reveal just how important time can be and why panics induce
challenges that are not readily captured in many standard economic models.
For example, Marvin Goodfriend and Robert King have argued that there is
no reason to expect the government to have better information than private
market participants regarding the actual health of a liquidity-constrained
financial institution, and thus there is minimal justification for having a
central bank engaged in financial regulation and liquidity support outside of
open market operations.179 Nonetheless, during the Crisis, numerous
institutions that subsequently revealed to be solvent faced significant
challenges obtaining the short-term liquidity they needed to remain
operational. Although over-determined, much of this tension can be
attributed to information asymmetry and precautionary liquidity hoarding
that was likely exacerbated by the absence of a sufficient standing regime for
addressing the spreading market dysfunction.180

178. See supra subpart I(B).
179. Marvin Goodfriend & Robert G. King, Financial Deregulation, Monetary Policy, and
Central Banking, in RESTRUCTURING BANKING AND FINANCIAL SERVICES IN AMERICA 15
(William S. Haraf & Rose Marie Kushmeider eds., 1988) (“[W]e know of no compelling rationale
for public provision of line-of-credit services to individual banks through a central bank discount
window” given that “today’s financial markets provide a highly efficient means of allocating credit
privately. Since central bank loan commitments do not appear to be necessary, neither do the
supporting regulation and supervision.”).
180. Liquidity hoarding may also have exacerbated the challenge. See Douglas Gale & Tanju
Yorulmazer, Liquidity Hoarding, 8 THEORETICAL ECON. 291, 311–12 (2013) (noting “absence of
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An additional benefit of time is that it may help market participants and
regulators see a situation more clearly by shifting the frame through which
they are looking at it. Although the term “panic” is often used in the context
of financial regulation as rational withdrawals by short-term creditors, it is
not by chance that these events have been labeled as panics—a term with
dictionary definitions that include “a sudden unreasoning terror often
accompanied by mass flight.”181 There is a rich body of literature, in fields
ranging from neuroscience to behavioral economics, showing the effect of
speed and context on decision-making and the ways a sense of panic can
reduce creativity and degrade decision quality.182 Removing a sense of panic
may meaningfully improve the quality of decisions made by market
participants and regulators alike.
To be sure, the claim here is not that the EGA is the sole tool available
to buy regulators precious time when a crisis strikes. Many ex ante
regulations, like capital and liquidity requirements, can also serve this aim
and likely will work in conjunction with the EGA to preserve some level of
stability while policymakers devise a longer-term solution. The advantages
of also having the EGA are twofold. First, the EGA can be deployed to bring
about stability in sectors of the market that were not subject to sufficient ex
ante regulation in light of the associated risks. Second, the EGA is unique in
also triggering an alarm clock of sorts, discouraging the tendency to delay
that can allow other buffers to be burned through without the sense of urgency
needed to address the difficult problems that may need attention to achieve a
more lasting resolution.
C.

Allocation of Authority
The importance of time takes on added importance when expanding the
focus to include concerns about legitimacy and democratic accountability.
To grossly oversimplify, there is an inverse relationship between the
governmental bodies with the institutional competence (including
information, expertise, relationships, and the like) to respond quickly to
contain a crisis and those that are democratically accountable. Thus,
inefﬁcient liquidity hoarding” as a feature of constrained-efﬁcient allocation); Viral V. Acharya &
Ouarda Merrouche, Precautionary Hoarding of Liquidity and Interbank Markets: Evidence from
the Sub-Prime Crisis 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16395, 2010),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16395 [https://perma.cc/2Y36-U62V] (presenting findings that
suggest stress in British money markets was caused in part by “weaker banks engaging in liquidity
hoarding as a precautionary response to their own credit risk”).
181. Panic, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2014).
182. E.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW 41 (2012); FRANK PARTNOY,
WAIT: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF DELAY 1–17 (2012) (describing recent work in neuroscience on
decision-making); Junchol Park et al., Anxiety Evokes Hypofrontality and Disrupts Rule-Relevant
Encoding by Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex Neurons, 36 J. NEUROSCIENCE 3322, 3322–23 (2016)
(employing a controlled study of rats to show the ways that a “sustained anxiety state” adversely
effects the neural functioning involved in decision-making).
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alongside allowing market participants and regulators time to gather and
distribute information in ways that can help alleviate the panic, time is also
critical to enabling the more democratically accountable, but relatively
uninformed, policymakers to play a meaningful role in allocation and other
issues that will inevitably arise in paving a lasting path to stability. Providing
time to get various policymakers up to speed is but one of the ways that the
EGA can promote a more appropriate allocation of authority among the
various bodies involved in efforts to contain a growing financial crisis.
1. Executive v. Congress.—A threshold issue given the separation of
powers among the Executive (which includes the administrative agencies as
well as the President), the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is which branch is
best suited to take the lead when a crisis first strikes. To tackle this issue, we
must start by understanding what the baseline is in the absence of adequate
existing crisis-management tools. One possibility, on display during the
Crisis, is that agencies within the executive branch creatively stretch
authority meant for other aims.183 During the early stages of the Crisis, the
Fed, Treasury, and FDIC each creatively deployed the powers granted to
them to try to mitigate the adverse effects of the fallout from the subprime
mortgage crisis.184 The other possibility is that Congress must intervene
quickly, with little information, or risk making the crisis far worse.185 This
also happened during the Crisis. Although early-stage efforts by the
Executive brought some relief, they were far from sufficient to address the
problem at hand. This led to a request by Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson,
supported by Fed Chair Ben Bernanke, for Congress to grant him
extraordinary new powers and $700 billion to help save the financial
system.186 Despite asking for authority to spend more than any single
government expenditure in history, Paulson’s proposed bill was only three
pages long, reflecting the fact that it was a rushed job rather than a thoughtout plan that could be subject to meaningful evaluation and debate.187
Congress balked. Despite the insertion of a range of measures designed to

183. E.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Crisis Governance in the Administrative State:
9/11 and the Financial Meltdown of 2008, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1613, 1628 (2009) (noting that “[m]ost
of the actions taken by the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Board, the SEC, and related
agencies fit within existing statutory authorities, but not all did” and that “[t]he most legally
questionable event was the bailout of AIG”), see also supra subpart II(A).
184. See supra subpart II(A).
185. See supra subpart II(B).
186. ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET
AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 465 (2009);
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 183, at 1624–25.
187. SORKIN, supra note 186, at 466.
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enhance accountability, the House voted the bill down, and the stock market
plummeted nearly 800 points.188
Congress eventually passed a bill providing the Treasury Secretary
much of the authority that he wanted but with a range of ancillary provisions
doled out to garner sufficient support.189 Even more troubling from a
democratic accountability standpoint is that the Act was sold to Congress as
a way to enable the Treasury Secretary to stabilize the financial system by
buying “toxic” mortgage assets. But it soon became clear that buying
mortgage-related assets was not going to be the best way to restore stability,
and the Secretary instead used the broad discretion that the Act granted him
to recapitalize an array of firms, including banks, AIG, and auto
companies.190
According to Posner and Vermeule, the vastness of the authority granted
to the Treasury (and exercised by the Fed) raises constitutional questions
under the nondelegation doctrine.191 They recognize “such a challenge is
highly unlikely to succeed,”192 but the very fact that Congress is pushing
against the constitutional bounds regarding the amount of authority it can vest
in another governmental body highlights how the nature of having to pass
legislation at the height of a crisis compelled a legislative grant that
effectively gave the Executive the capacity to devise a plan after Congress
had acted, thus denying them their normal role in reviewing, providing
feedback on, and approving that plan.
This is not just a story of the Crisis but of crises generally, and of the
inherent mismatch between the demands crises pose and the institutional
competence of Congress as a body. Political theorists have long observed that
it is amazing, given their size and composition, that legislatures manage to
get anything done even under the best of circumstances.193 Congressional
lawmaking requires the approval of the majority of two chambers of
Congress, one with 100 members, the other with 435.194 This usually entails
188. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 183, at 1625.
189. 12 U.S.C. § 5211 (2012).
190. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 183, at 1626–27; see also BERNANKE, supra note 137, at
301–04 (acknowledging that: (i) even though it was never discussed with Congress, a number of
financial regulators believed that recapitalizing banks was more likely to work than buying up toxic
assets and (ii) the Treasury Secretary intentionally ensured the language was sufficiently broad to
allow either course of action); SORKIN, supra note 186, at 489 (recounting a conversation in which
Stephen Schwarzman, head of Blackstone, explained to Paulson the problems with the plan that
sought to buy toxic assets).
191. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 183, at 1630–34.
192. Id. at 1631.
193. Jeremy Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation, 54 MD. L. REV. 633, 639–41 (1995)
(identifying William Blackstone, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and John Stuart Mills as among the many
who have opined on the challenge of legislating in light of “the sheer numbers . . . of persons that
law-making involves” (emphasis omitted)).
194. The Legislative Branch, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA, https://
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a process in which distinct bills are introduced in each chamber; referred to
the appropriate committees therein; subjected to scrutiny, debate, and
amendment within that committee; subjected to scrutiny, debate, and
amendment on the floor; passed within each chamber; revised further by a
conference committee with members from both the House and Senate; sent
back to each chamber for approval in the revised form; and only then
presented to the President to sign into law.195 This is a time-intensive process
in which the substance of the bill is expected to evolve, often quite
significantly, even if the bill is one of the few eventually adopted into law.196
Also worth emphasizing is that despite meaningful debates—both descriptive
and normative—about the nature of legislatures, theorists are united in
viewing deliberation as core to the legislative process and the legitimacy of
the legislation thus produced.197
Emergencies, however, require prompt action. Even modest delays can
exacerbate the size of a crisis. Allowing Congress the time required for it to
develop the required information and expertise, and to gather feedback from
constituents, as they would need to in order to develop an appropriate
legislative response, would only increase the magnitude of the recession
everyone is seeking to minimize. Although emergency legislation may be but
one form of a growing body of “unorthodox” lawmaking that is becoming
the new norm, it is a form that significantly alters the balance of power
between Congress and the Executive and undermines the role Congress is
meant to play.198
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/1600/legislative-branch [https://perma.cc/4G47-RRQL].
195. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND
REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 29 (5th ed. 2014).
196. Legislative Productivity in Congress and Workload, THE BROOKINGS INST. 1, 3, 7,
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Vital-Statistics-Chapter-6-LegislativeProductivity-in-Congress-and-Workload_UPDATE.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG7Q-48LB] in Vital
Statistics on Congress: Data on the U.S. Congress, Updated May 2018, THE BROOKINGS INST.
(May 21, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/multi-chapter-report/vital-statistics-on-congress/
[https://perma.cc/2HCQ-KAVF] (statistically documenting the small proportion of bills introduced
that actually become law in the post-War period).
197. ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 195, at 262 (“Both pluralist (agency) and republican
(trusteeship) theorists emphasize the importance of legislative deliberation . . . .”).
198. Although Posner and Vermeule may view this as an inevitable and even appropriate
development even outside of crisis periods, others view this as far less benign. Cf. ERIC A. POSNER
& ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND: AFTER THE MADISONIAN REPUBLIC 16–17
(2010) (concluding that a Madisonian regime with separation of powers is obsolete), with Harvey
Mansfield, Is the Imperial Presidency Inevitable?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 13, 2011), https://www
.nytimes.com/2011/03/13/books/review/book-review-the-executive-unbound-by-eric-a-posnerand-adrian-vermeule.html [https://perma.cc/HA8N-8VCT] (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN
VERMEULE, THE EXECUTIVE UNBOUND) (arguing that the authors “should reconsider whether
formal institutions like the separation of powers in the Constitution are as insignificant as they say”),
and PHILLIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 1 (2014) (arguing that it is time
to “reconsider the lawfulness of administrative law”). See also SCOTT, supra note 29, at xviii–xxi
(calling for Congress to grant “strong anti-contagion weapons” to fight financial crises but realizing
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In short, the Executive must take the lead during a crisis. If it lacks
sufficient power to address the crisis at hand, whether that crisis takes the
form of a threat to financial stability or the need to respond to a terrorist
attack, Congress may have little choice but to act quickly to provide the
Executive new power subject to limited oversight to ensure the situation is
addressed.199 In addition to raising fundamental constitutional questions
about the allocation of authority, this state of affairs also undermines the
legitimacy of crisis-era interventions in ways that can contribute to public
distrust. One of the early manifestations of the populism that has swept much
of the globe was the Occupy Wall Street movement, which embodied broadly
held perceptions that policymakers had bailed out Wall Street while doing
too little for Main Street.200 That movement is now giving rise to a host of
policy changes that includes greater protectionism and new limits on
immigration.201 Both by enabling a greater role for Congress and by allowing
greater two-way communication with the public, the EGA could set the stage
for a process in which the long-term response does more to address the
fairness and other issues that crises inevitably pose.
The effort to utilize the unique capabilities of the Executive without
excessively compromising democratic legitimacy serves to again highlight
why the limits of the EGA are more of a virtue than a drawback. The EGA
does not provide a magic bullet for inherently difficult questions. It instead
sets the stage for a process that allows more meaningful engagement by a
broader swath of actors in ways suited to their competencies. The EGA
provides the executive branch with a great deal of authority and discretion,
consistent with Posner and Vermeule’s assessment of what emergencies
require. At the same time, the Secretary can invoke the EGA only after
determining that legislatively numerated conditions have been satisfied, and
congressional approval remains a prerequisite to the provision of fresh

the impossibility); Charles W. Calomiris, Government by ‘Guidance’ Quashes Economic Freedom
and Rule of Law, FORBES (Jan. 5, 2015, 7:56 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/charlescalomiris
/2015/01/05/government-by-guidance-quashes-economic-freedom-and-rule-of-law
[https://perma.cc/C2DY-2H5N] (characterizing agency informal rulemaking and guidance as
“imperious bureaucracy” and calling for greater congressional oversight over agency-made rules
and budgets).
199. From the perspective of Posner and Vermeule, this state of affairs may be inevitable and
even desirable, but most others are far less sanguine. Cf. POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 198, at
14, 198–200 (“[T]he [framers’] decision to give emergency powers to Congress . . . rather than the
president, probably did not help forestall a dictatorship. Lincoln violated the clause, and Congress
acquiesced.”), with Gluck et al., supra note 145 at 1789 (criticizing the broadness of and lack of
attention paid to emergency legislation).
200. E.g., Robert L. Borosage, The Populist Moment Has Finally Arrived, NATION (Mar. 23,
2015), https://www.thenation.com/article/occupy-and-organize/ [https://perma.cc/PQY7-HTPA];
Levitin, supra note 51.
201. Rogers Brubaker, Populism’s Perfect Storm, BOS. REV. (July 11, 2017),
http://bostonreview.net/politics/rogers-brubaker-populisms-perfect-storm [https://perma.cc/SB6XG8JU].
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capital, structural reforms, longer term guarantees, or other more substantive
interventions that are likely to be necessary to achieve lasting stability. After
the crisis has been resolved, it will also be in the hands of Congress to
determine whether an industry has been sufficiently reformed such that the
EGA should be reauthorized if previously used to support that industry.
Although the EGA can by no means assure procedural perfection any more
than it can guarantee an outcome that perfectly balances stability and fairness,
the EGA sets the stage for a more appropriate allocation of authority in light
of the nature of the institutions involved.
2. Within the Executive.—Both because of the explosion in the size of
the administrative state today relative to the country’s founding and because
there are carefully delineated mechanisms within the administrative state that
affect the degree of presidential control and political responsiveness of
various administrative actors, it is important to also explain why a particular
actor within the executive—here, the Treasury Secretary, in consultation with
the President—should make a particular determination.
In some ways, the Federal Reserve might seem like the more suitable
body to have this authority. Central banks have a long history of helping to
restore calm during periods of panic and the Federal Reserve likely has more
of the information and expertise that will be needed to address an unfolding
crisis than the Treasury.202 For these reasons, the Fed very likely will be
deeply involved in any invocation of the EGA. Formally, it will have the
ability to trigger consideration of whether the EGA should be invoked, and it
may also be empowered to play a meaningful, even possibly lead, role in
implementation. The Crisis, however, and the backlash to it, brought to life
the challenges of having a central bank play too great a role in crisis
management.
The Federal Reserve, like other central banks, is structured so as to
provide it greater independence than any other federal agency, with
protections including effective control over its budget, exceptionally long
terms for each of the governors, the inability of governors to be removed
other than for cause, and limited judicial review of its decisions.203 This
202. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. & Dep’t of the Treasury, The
Role of the Federal Reserve in Preserving Financial and Monetary Stability Joint Statement by the
Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve (Mar. 23, 2009), https://www.federalreserve
.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/monetary20090323b.htm [https://perma.cc/K4UT-8PEC].
203. Judge, supra note 17, at 65–67; Charles I. Plosser, The Importance of a Regional and
Independent Federal Reserve, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF PA., OUT OF MANY. . . ONE: 2009
ANNUAL REPORT 8, 8–9, 12–13 (2009), https://www.philadelphiafed.org//media/publications
/annual-report/2009/2009-annual-report.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/Z3GL-9SKL]; Who Are the
Members of the Federal Reserve Board, and How Are They Selected?, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FED. RESERVE SYS. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/about
_12591.htm [https://perma.cc/6K7M-F336].
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independence is justified on the basis that one of the Fed’s most important
functions is monetary policy, and to implement that function in the way that
best serves the long-term interests of the country the Fed must sometimes
make decisions that entail short-term costs. Empirical work supports the
notion that time consistency justifies central bank independence when it
comes to monetary policy.204
Central bank independence is relevant here in two ways. On a pragmatic
level, having a central bank take actions that have salient distribution
consequences sets the stage for backlash that might threaten its capacity to
remain independent even when exercising its monetary authority.205 As
Kevin Warsh, a Fed Governor, noted in late 2008: “The circumstances of . . .
[2008] caused us to cross more lines than this institution has crossed in the
previous seventy years.”206 The public noticed. When Alan Greenspan left
his position as Chair of the Fed in 2006, he enjoyed an approval rating
between 65% and 72%.207 By contrast, when Ben Bernanke completed his
term as Chair, his approval rating was a mere 40%, and his approval rating
was even lower among Americans who made less than $60,000 a year.208

204. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Speech at the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies
International Conference: Central Bank Independence, Transparency, and Accountability, Bank of
Japan, Tokyo, Japan (May 26, 2010), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents
/speech/bernanke20100525a.htm [https://perma.cc/8FSV-YMV6]; see also Rosa M. Lastra &
Geoffrey P. Miller, Central Bank Independence in Ordinary and Extraordinary Times, in CENTRAL
BANK INDEPENDENCE: THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS, AND
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 31, 31–33 (Jan Kleineman ed., 2001) (stating that there is evidence
that independent central banks maintain price stability better than nonindependent central banks);
Alberto Alesina & Lawrence Summers, Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic
Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 151, 151–52 (1993)
(stating that “insulating monetary policy from the political process” avoids time-inconsistency
problems and enforces low-inflation equilibriums); Frederic S. Mishkin, Monetary Policy Strategy:
Lessons From the Crisis 8–10 (Feb. 2011) (Nat. Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 16755),
https://www.imf.org/external
/np/seminars/eng/2011/res2/pdf/fm.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XZ9-JVY3] (stating time-inconsistent
policies can lead to worse outcomes than predictable rules, and central bank independence avoids
the problem and improves macroeconomic performance).
205. Zoe Thomas, Why Do Many Americans Mistrust the Federal Reserve?, BBC NEWS (Dec.
15, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-35079495 [https://perma.cc/HET9-K6PH]; see
also Andrew Flowers & Harry Enten, The Fed Has Never Been More Polarizing,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Feb. 24, 2015), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/the-fed-has-never-beenmore-polarizing/ [https://perma.cc/H34W-SVKT] (showing that there was a precipitous decline in
public support for the Fed in the years before and during the Crisis, and while support among
Democrats has started to rebound, it has continued to wane among Republicans).
206. Cassidy, supra note 143.
207. Sarah Binder, Why It Matters What the Public Thinks about Janet Yellen, WASH. POST
(Feb. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/02/11/why-itmatters-what-the-public-thinks-about-janet-yellen/?utm_term=.d68735547739 [https://perma.cc
/LW7G-GWA4] (showing the results of the various polls conducted); Thomas, supra note 203
(stating that Greenspan’s approval rating was 72% in 2006).
208. Andrew Dugan, Fed Chairman Bernanke Leaves with Mixed Verdict, GALLUP (Jan. 29,
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The Federal Reserve as an institution fares even worse. In 2015, just
one-third of Americans felt that the Fed was doing a good or an excellent
job—a rating that puts the Federal Reserve second to the bottom among all
federal agencies.209 Only the IRS is less well-liked.210 In light of recent
electoral upsets and meaningful efforts from both sides of the political
spectrum to reduce the Fed’s autonomy, these developments cannot be
dismissed. There is a long history of American distrust of central banking
that has resulted in the demise of more than one of the nation’s central
banks.211
Just as importantly, giving the central bank authority to make these types
of decisions is hard to justify normatively. When shifting from monetary
policy to financial regulation, there is far less theoretical support for the
notion that a central bank should be making decisions with significant
allocation implications, and emergency-era interventions inevitably have
effects on allocation. The Treasury Secretary is a member of the President’s
Cabinet and is expected to work far more closely with, and under the
guidance of, the President than an independent agency.212 This is part of the
reason that the Treasury Secretary has frequently been the one empowered to
make systemic risk and liquidity determinations and to play a central role in
authorizing interventions to stabilize the financial system.213 This by no
means assures legitimacy, but it enhances accountability by ensuring that the
EGA can never be invoked without direct consultation with the most
powerful elected official.
Putting these pieces together, having the Treasury Secretary serve as the
key instigator and having the Treasury Department directly bear the
economic risk allows the Federal Reserve to focus on traditional central
2014),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/167099/fed-chairman-bernanke-leaves-mixed-verdict.aspx
[https://perma.cc/Y6T8-3MMT].
209. Thomas, supra note 205.
210. Id.
211. E.g., SCOTT, supra note 29, at 80–88 (describing the rise and fall of the First and Second
National Banks of the United States and the controversy surrounding the creation of the Federal
Reserve).
212. The Executive Branch, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-whitehouse/the-executive-branch/ [https://perma.cc/7WCX-SXC4].
213. E.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343 § 2, 122 Stat.
3765, 3766 (2008) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (2012)) (stating the purpose of the Act is to
“immediately provide authority and facilities that the Secretary of the Treasury can use to restore
liquidity and stability to the financial system of the United States”); Housing and Economic
Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289 §§ 1101, 1118, 122 Stat. 2654, 2661–62, 2688 (2006)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4511, 4513) (authorizing the Secretary to place Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac into conservatorship or receivership); see also Gretchen Morgenson, Fannie and
Freddie’s Government Rescue Has Come with Claws, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/13/business/fannie-and-freddies-government-rescue-has-comewith-claws.html [https://perma.cc/6YTK-EE9F] (describing events leading up to and following
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac being taken into conservatorship).
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banking. Reducing pressure on the Fed to stretch its authority is important on
both pragmatic and normative grounds. Simultaneously increasing the
pressure on the Treasury to take a lead in making difficult decisions further
improves democratic legitimacy relative to the current, inadvertent status
quo.
D.

Dynamism

The final feature worth highlighting is the capacity of the EGA to
address challenges even when they arise outside of the regulated sphere.
Today’s banking system, at least in the United States, is far better capitalized
than it was prior to the Crisis.214 From the Fed’s discount window to the
possibility of FDIC guarantees, there are also a number of ex post tools that
remain available to mitigate a crisis as it afflicts formal banks. The EGA
should be available for banks when appropriate, and the banking system is
often implicated—whether by interconnections or common exposures—even
when problems first arise elsewhere. Nonetheless, the primary rationale for
institutionalizing something as broad as the EGA is not the banking sector.
The reason the EGA is such a critical addition to the current crisismanagement toolkit is the inevitable dynamism of financial markets, and the
possibility of institutions arising that may not be seen as systemically
important until a crisis actually strikes. Although the particular system of
market-based intermediation known today as the “shadow banking system”
is a recent phenomenon, the pattern of short-term debt creation migrating
outside the banking system and instability arising in those domains has been
repeated throughout history.215 The dynamism of finance makes this
challenge inevitable. As explained in a recent IMF report on regulating for
systemic stability: “Some (perhaps many) risks though will remain
undiscovered, not just because of a lack of attention by markets, supervisory
agencies and others, but because they are not easily recognizable. Indeed,
sometimes these (system) risks of a (new) product are not even known by the
purveyor.”216
Recognizing the inherent dynamism of financial markets and the
214. Roger Lowenstein, A Legacy of the Financial Crisis? The Makings of the Next One,
WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/a-legacy-of-thefinancial-crisis-the-makings-of-the-next-one/2018/09/07/de26aa46-af0c-11e8-a20b5f4f84429666_story.html?utm_term=.97c971c00533 [https://perma.cc/YW9N-RSL3].
215. Rockoff, supra note 65, at 3 (examining the dozen financial panics that occurred in the
United States from the Panic of 1819 through the Crisis and finding that “[t]ypically, panics were
started by a cluster of failures in which shadow banks played a prominent role”).
216. Stijn Claessens & Laura Kodres, The Regulatory Responses to the Global Financial
Crisis: Some Uncomfortable Questions 13 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/14/46,
2014), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2016/12/31/The-Regulatory-Responses-tothe-Global-Financial-Crisis-Some-Uncomfortable-Questions-41422
[https://perma.cc/NG577ZYU].
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inevitability of fragility outside the direct purview of prudential regulators
affirms the critical need for crisis-management instruments that can be
deployed outside the regulated space. The EGA has this capacity. It enables
financial regulators to target problems at their source, wherever that may be.
This allows regulators to develop responses that are more closely tailored to
the ends they are trying to achieve, potentially reducing the temptation to
stretch other sources of authority. It also allows them to demand information
from entities they do not otherwise oversee, allowing them to more quickly
devise a comprehensive understanding of where losses lie and the challenges
underlying the panic.217 Although discussed last, this flexibility may be the
greatest virtue of the EGA.
E.

Creativity and Risk Taking
One of the core ways that the EGA here proposed differs from current
emergency-era authority in the United States and most places is in its breadth.
Beyond allowing regulators the capacity to address problems that arise
outside the regulated sphere, this scope can also make it easier for regulators
to use the tools available when problems arise in that sphere. Consider, for
example, the ongoing questions about whether a bank holding company with
seemingly sufficient loss-absorbing capital and a recently refreshed living
will can go through a bankruptcy proceeding without recreating the fallout
that followed Lehman’s failure. Most agree that long-term, moral hazard
might be far better contained if it could.218 And, at least in theory, such an
institution should be far more capable of orderly resolution today than it was
a decade ago. Nonetheless, pressing questions remain about whether a
bankruptcy proceeding will actually work as hoped, leading to ongoing fears
that regulators may lack the courage to give it a try. After Lehman Brothers,
regulators may be understandably hesitant to just give it a try and hope for
the best, even if probabilistically, it looks like it should work.
The EGA changes that calculus. A Treasury Secretary discussing
options with other lead regulators could now be assured that if something
equivalent to the Primary Reserve Fund’s breaking the buck were to occur
despite their best planning, he could respond swiftly and powerfully to
contain that additional fallout. Additionally, the Secretary could announce an
intention to use that authority to contain any further fallout simultaneously
with the announcement of the bankruptcy, further reducing the likelihood of
panic and disruption. Without getting too Pollyanna and suggesting the very
217. For more on the value of having regulators provide emergency-era support to nonbanks in
exchange for information, see Kathryn Judge, The First Year: The Role of a Modern Lender of Last
Resort, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 843 (2016).
218. See David A. Skeel Jr., Single Point of Entry and the Bankruptcy Alternative, in ACROSS
THE GREAT DIVIDE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 315–16 (Martin N. Bailey &
John B. Taylor eds., 2014) (recognizing that Lehman failed to plan for bankruptcy because it
expected a bailout, which led to significant monetary losses).

JUDGE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

3/31/19 1:37 PM

Guarantor of Last Resort

759

existence of the EGA will make it possible never to need it, the claim here is
that the benefits of the EGA go beyond situations when it is used. Just like a
lender of last resort, there are likely to be some circumstances when just
having an EGA can help calm markets and give regulators the backbone to
take the types of risks that can be crucial to reducing the moral hazard
concerns that arise after a crisis.
V.

Some Counter-Arguments

A.

Moral Hazard
Moral hazard may be the biggest reason not to adopt the EGA. Giving
the Treasury Secretary broad guarantee authority may incline financial
institutions to assume greater risks and might weaken the market discipline
that counterparties and creditors would otherwise impose. Although there is
deep disagreement about whether and to what extent moral hazard is a
problem, there are good reasons for concern.219 If market participants
anticipate being protected from certain downsides, this can alter their
propensity to monitor and limit risk in troubling ways.
As a starting point, the EGA here proposed is meant to complement, not
displace, the massive system of ex ante regulation currently in place. Once
institutions or activities are revealed to be meaningful sources of systemic
risk, it is critical to develop appropriate mechanisms of prudential regulation
and oversight to mitigate or force internalization of the associated
externalities. The assumption that such regulation will be incomplete is not
to disregard its critical importance.
Additionally, assessing the myriad ways that an EGA might alter
incentives requires starting with an appropriate baseline. The baseline today
is not a world in which market forces operate without any government
interference or where those interventions will be limited to what the law
currently allows.220 Because of the externalities that runs and failures can
trigger, the government cannot credibly commit to not intervene in the face
of disaster.221 The EGA adds structure and discipline in its mandatory
elements, and, by giving the Secretary broad authority to intervene when
needed, it might actually make it easier for regulators to take the chance of
allowing an institution to fail when the ramifications of that failure are
unknown.
Also important are the ways the mandatory procedural limits reduce

219. For a summary of the mixed views on moral hazard, see Posner, supra note 24, at 1540
n.35 and sources cited therein.
220. See supra subpart II(A).
221. See Charles W. Calomiris et al., Establishing Credible Rules for Fed Emergency Lending,
9 J. FIN. ECON. POL’Y 260, 262 (2017) (concluding that externalities arising from events threatening
financial institutions have the capacity to destroy the entire financial system).
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moral hazard and could facilitate the path to reform. Because the EGA can
only be invoked when the Treasury Secretary determines that there is a
sufficient threat to the functioning of the financial system as a whole,
idiosyncratic risk should remain subject to significant market discipline. The
temporal limit on the EGA means that it cannot be used to solve or avoid
capital deficiencies. Additionally, the requirement that the EGA, once
invoked, cannot again be used to protect the same class of claimants provides
institutions with a strong incentive never to put themselves in a situation
where the EGA would need to be used to protect their claimants. Once
government support is needed, the industry or firm receiving support will
likely face a long-term choice between inviting massive reform (in order to
justify having Congress re-extend the possibility of protection) or demise.
Apart from the statutorily imposed limits on when the EGA will be
invoked, the Secretary could further mitigate the moral hazard by providing
guidelines regarding when and how the Secretary anticipates using the EGA.
A classic maxim in financial regulation is that regulators should allow the
first bank to fail and save all of the others.222 This creates healthy discipline
during normal times because no bank wants to take greater risks than others,
particularly if banks understand that this is the policy they will face. This
advice was not followed in the Crisis, perhaps because regulators lacked clear
authority to limit the knock-on effects that one bank’s failure might trigger.
Nonetheless, with the EGA, a Secretary could issue guidance or otherwise
indicate an intention to follow this type of procedure, putting firms on notice
that failure is an option because of (rather than despite) the existence of the
EGA.
There is no way to know in advance precisely how the EGA will be
utilized by any particular administration. It is impossible to deny that vesting
this type of authority in an executive body could lead to abuse. But the same
political accountability that enables the possibility of abuse could also prove
remarkably effective at limiting excess use of other regulatory tools (like an
overly lax lender of last resort) and reducing expectations that Congress will
jump in and grant broad executive authority to save all distressed firms.
Starting with a realistic baseline that recognizes that market participants
already expect significant government support in the event of systemic
distress shows why the EGA may well reduce the aggregate moral hazard in
the system.

222. See Joel Shapiro & David Skeie, Information Management in Banking Crises, 28 REV.
FIN. STUD. 2322, 2323 (2015) (discussing a regulator’s incentive to build a reputation with the first
bank so subsequent banks are put on notice that they may not be bailed out).
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B.

Fairness
Two related issues that have received significant attention in the wake
of the Crisis are unfairness and perceptions of unfairness. With the exception
of Lehman Brothers, the government did not allow a single major financial
institution to fail.223 This approach may have been effective in helping to
contain the growing crisis, but it also bestowed a significant largesse on their
employees, creditors, and other stakeholders. Efforts to help homeowners,
meanwhile, provided far less aid than originally promised,224 even though
providing greater aid to homeowners and otherwise reducing the debt burden
of average Americans may have been an effective way to reduce the size of
the recession following the Crisis.225 That even less was done to help those
who lost jobs or had their retirement savings wiped out led to a widespread
perception that regulators intervened to help Wall Street but not Main
Street.226
These are important concerns that merit center stage in devising the
government’s response to the next financial crisis. They are, however, only
tangentially related to the proposal here. The EGA is designed to stop the
bleeding and provide policymakers the breathing room required to devise a
plan for addressing underlying deficiencies and improving the
macroeconomic outlook; it says nothing about what that plan should look
like. The inherently finite nature of the EGA ensures that apart from
circumstances where the underlying problems are truly modest in nature,

223. James B. Stewart & Peter Eavis, Revisiting the Lehman Brothers Bailout That Never Was,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/business/revisiting-thelehman-brothers-bailout-that-never-was.html [https://perma.cc/DBB3-P4ZB].
224. E.g., CHRISTY G. ROMERO, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: JANUARY 27, 2016, 74–76 (2016)
(describing the frequency of wrongful terminations of homeowners by servicers participating in
HAMP); CHRISTY L. ROMERO, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GEN. FOR THE TROUBLED
ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, QUARTERLY REPORT TO CONGRESS: JULY 29, 2015, 101–08 (2015)
(showing that 70% of mortgagees who applied for HAMP were turned down and raising a host of
other questions about the efficacy of the program); David Dayen, The Government Program that
Failed Homeowners, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/money/2014/mar
/30/government-program-save-homes-mortgages-failure-banks
[https://perma.cc/C9GU-GJB3]
(explaining that five years after the launch of HAMP “[f]ewer than one million homeowners remain
in the . . . program – just a quarter of its target – and $28bn of the funding remains unspent” and
further noting that of the 1.3 million who did receive permanent modifications to the terms of their
mortgage, “350,000 of them defaulted again . . . and were evicted from their homes”).
225. ATIF MIAN & AMIR SUFI, HOUSE OF DEBT: HOW THEY (AND YOU) CAUSED THE GREAT
RECESSION, AND HOW WE CAN PREVENT IT FROM HAPPENING AGAIN 142, 145–48, 163 (2014)
(“The most effective policy puts cash into the hands of those who will spend the most of it, and
indebted home owners have an extremely high marginal propensity to consume.”).
226. See Nin-Hai Tseng, The Bailout Wall Street Is Blocking from Main Street, FORTUNE
(Aug. 9, 2013), http://fortune.com/2013/08/09/the-bailout-wall-street-is-blocking-from-mainstreet/ [https://perma.cc/2R2X-AENC] (noting that unlike Wall Street, “Main Street never got” a
bailout).
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further action will be required. Those actions could entail providing capital
support to banks and other large firms, as happened during the Crisis, or
providing debt relief to homeowners or other borrowers, a path that could
have been but was not taken during the Crisis.227 It is true that the EGA will
likely be deployed to protect the stability of fragile financial institutions that
may have played a role in contributing to the Crisis, but having in place a
time-limited tool to stop the bleeding makes it possible for elected officials
and others concerned with fairness and legitimacy to devise a long-term
solution that takes those considerations into account.
C.

Credit Risk
Another concern is that guaranteeing financial claims entails credit risk.
Given the potential scale of the programs envisioned and the potential need
for the Treasury to respond with limited information regarding the quality of
the underlying assets, the credit risk could be substantial. This is a legitimate
concern, and one of the reasons that the Treasury Department, and not the
Federal Reserve, should control the EGA. In contrast to idealized notions of
how a lender of last resort might work, the guarantees here envisioned could
entail fiscal judgments. These are the type of decisions best made by more
politically accountable actors.
In practice, the magnitude of credit risk may well be quite modest
relative to the claims insured. For example, in November 2008, at the height
of its efforts to contain the Crisis, the Federal Reserve had extended more
than $710 billion in credit pursuant to its authority to lend money to non-bank
institutions under unusual and exigent circumstances.228 As of January 2016,
the Federal Reserve had earned more than $30 billion on those loans while
incurring no losses.229 The crisis-era investments by the Treasury Department
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) did entail some losses, but
on net yielded more than $15 billion in profits for the U.S. government, a far
cry from the large losses many predicted initially.230 This does not necessarily
mean that the government was compensated fully in light of the magnitude

227. For a discussion of the tradeoffs of these different approaches, see MIAN & SUFI, supra
note 223, at 122–26, 142, 145–48.
228. Labonte, supra note 111, at 1–2. This authority is somewhat akin to the use of the EGA in
that in contrast to the Federal Reserve’s discount-window lending to banks, these loans are not made
in connection with the prudential oversight of the Federal Reserve and other bank regulators.
229. Id. at 2.
230. Russell Berman, The U.S. Made $15 Billion from Bailouts, ATLANTIC (Dec. 19, 2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/12/treasury-announces-sale-ally-financialstock-end-of-tarp-program/383939/ [https://perma.cc/XF77-TLG2]. The most recent data is
available at Monthly Report to Congress, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov
/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/Monthly-Report-to-Congress.aspx
[https://perma.cc/H2HP-F7RV].
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of the credit risk that it assumed.231 Nonetheless, these figures attest to the
fact that the government may be able to provide quite significant support
during periods of widespread systemic distress while exposing taxpayers to
modest, if any, losses. More generally, because the EGA will generally be
deployed to maintain, rather than change, the status quo, the government will
often be stepping in to assume liquidity or other risks that private market
participants had been willing to bear up until the crisis hit. So long as
government intervention is not assumed irrespective of circumstance, and the
EGA makes that unlikely, the market discipline at play outside of crisis
periods should help mitigate the credit risk to which the government is
exposed once crisis hits.
More importantly, the credit risk associated with the EGA is more of an
issue of how it should be deployed rather than whether it should be adopted.
The government regularly spends money in a variety of ways. The question
is not whether there is a fiscal component to a broad guarantee scheme but
whether it is justified in light of the expected benefits. Given the
informational dynamics, these types of calculations may be speculative but
they do provide a meaningful framework that can be used to address the
relevant question, which is not whether there is credit risk but whether that
credit risk is justified.
D.

Funding and Other Implementation Challenges
The issue of credit risk also implicates another challenge: How to fund
the EGA should the Treasury need to make good on guarantees in excess of
any fees the program might earn. A related issue is whether the debt ceiling
might become an issue. Although the Treasury’s use of the Exchange
Stabilization Fund to backstop money market mutual funds demonstrates that
guarantees can be effective even when the assets backing the guarantee are
dwarfed by the value of the claims covered, there is some limit.232 These are
but two of the range of issues that might arise in connection with adopting
and implementing the EGA as proposed here.
Some of these challenges, like the debt ceiling, arise from potential
conflicts between the EGA and other laws. Another domain where these

231. E.g., Matt Palumbo, Overselling TARP: The Myth of the $15 Billion Profit, NAT’L REV.
(Jan. 6, 2015), https://www.nationalreview.com/2015/01/overselling-tarp-myth-15-billion-profitmatt-palumbo/ [https://perma.cc/9FSM-LTKZ] (noting that “while a profit of $15 billion sounds
enormous, it only amounts to a nominal annualized return of 0.6 percent”); Jonathan Weisman, U.S.
Declares Bank and Auto Bailouts Over, and Profitable, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 19, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/20/business/us-signals-end-of-bailouts-of-automakers-andwall-street.html [https://perma.cc/Q92Z-6TDX] (“Given the scale of the broader economic losses
and the risk the government took to protect Wall Street and Detroit, a $15 billion profit on a $426
billion investment is nothing to celebrate, said [MIT economist] Simon Johnson . . . .”).
232. Macey, supra note 100, at 149–50.

JUDGE.PRINTER.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

764

3/31/19 1:37 PM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 97:707

types of issues might arise relates to information. There are meaningful
restrictions on how information can be shared among government agencies
and procedural hurdles on the government’s capacity to demand information
from firms, creating frictions that would need to be addressed for the EGA to
work as intended.233 To the extent these types of challenges are foreseeable,
it may be possible to address them as part of the implementing legislation.
That said, there are likely to be issues that are not as foreseeable or not subject
to clean, ex ante resolution.234 These will most likely need to be addressed
during implementation. For example, due process concerns might be
addressed by extending guarantees directly to the holders of certain types of
financial claims without imposing any obligations on the issuer if the issuer
does not consent and it is determined that this mode of intervention is justified
by systemic considerations.
There could well be a host of other issues that arise during
implementation. For example, to succeed in halting a run, the EGA must be
implemented in a manner that addresses liquidity risk, not just credit risk. If
short-term creditors expect that they will have to wait months to be paid, even
if eventually paid in full, they may still have an incentive to withdraw shortterm funds. Similarly, there are logistical challenges inherent in seeking to
make the EGA one part of an overall scheme that entails gathering the
information required to identify and address underlying weaknesses. These
considerations cannot be fully addressed in advance, but they do raise a
number of issues that can be mitigated through appropriate advance planning.
As a starting point, the EGA specifically envisions that other financial
regulators will play important roles alongside the Treasury Department.
Although the Treasury Secretary must make the required systemic risk
determinations and the Treasury Department bears the credit risk should the
guarantees ultimately result in any losses, other regulators can prompt
consideration of whether a class of claimants should be protected and other
regulators can help with implementation. Other regulators will likely also
play critical roles in implementation. In this regard, the EGA is not all that
different than the current Orderly Liquidation Authority, which must be
approved by the Treasury Secretary and depends on liquidity and credit
provided by the Treasury Department, but which is implemented primarily
by the FDIC.235 The Federal Reserve is also likely to play a prominent role
in implementation of the EGA and in the process of identifying and

233. See Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3521 (2012) (enumerating conditions
that federal agencies must follow to collect and share information).
234. Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Margaret L. Merrill, Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation
Authority: Too Big for the Constitution?, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 173–74 (2014) (discussing Title II
of the Dodd-Frank Act and arguing that the legislation raises multiple constitutional questions).
235. Aaron Klein, A Primer on Dodd-Frank’s Orderly Liquidation Authority, BROOKINGS: UP
FRONT (June 5, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/06/05/a-primer-on-doddfranks-orderly-liquidation-authority/ [https://perma.cc/25X8-A83E].
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addressing the deficiencies threatening the system. Given the patchwork
nature of the financial-regulatory architecture in the United States, this type
of coordination is unavoidable even if challenging.
Enhancing the Treasury Secretary’s ability to work closely with other
regulators in both determining whether to invoke the EGA and implementing
any guarantees if adopted is the Secretary’s position as the head of the
Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC). The leaders of all of the
important federal financial regulators are FSOC members, and the FSOC is
specifically charged with identifying and helping to address systemic risk. In
addition to affirming the expectation that the Treasury Department play a
central role in promoting systemic stability, the Secretary’s role as head of
FSOC puts her in the position to ensure that the EGA is implemented in a
manner that complements other efforts underway by various financial
regulators to address the burgeoning crisis the Secretary seeks to help
contain.
None of this is to ignore the significant challenges that will exist to
ensuring that the EGA can work and will work as envisioned. Some
additional progress can be made through ongoing monitoring, advanced
planning, and ramping up information gathering even in response to soft
signals that something is amiss. The EGA is not a tool that should be ignored
entirely until crisis hits. Ongoing diligence and advanced planning are
critical. At the same time, one reason for the EGA is the inevitable dynamism
of the financial system. It allows regulators to respond to contain a crisis even
when risks arise in unexpected places or propagate in unexpected ways.
Accordingly, any advanced planning and guidance should serve as a starting
point rather than a straitjacket when the time comes to invoke the EGA.
Conclusion
A guarantor of last resort will not prevent the next crisis. But a guarantor
of last resort should improve the prospects, both in terms of macroeconomic
outcome and accountability, when that crisis strikes. An EGA enables
policymakers to contain a crisis in a timely fashion, reducing the spillover
effects on the real economy. It also denies policymakers the option of putting
off the difficult task of identifying and addressing the underlying problems,
further mitigating the macroeconomic costs. Just as importantly, the EGA
proposed here would enable regulators to respond irrespective of where the
next crisis erupts, addressing the inevitable dynamism of financial markets.
And it would help to restore a more appropriate balance of power between
Congress and the President and within the executive branch.
The EGA is not a first-best solution to financial fragility. It will not stop
the next crisis or cause moral hazard to disappear. Nor will it address the
fairness concerns that so often arise when the steps required to bring about
stability benefit the same financial market participants who helped create the
fragility. But the EGA does belie the fiction that there is always a tradeoff
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between
resilience
and
accountability.
By
creating
an
emergency-era regime that brings with it internal mechanisms for producing
and transmitting information and passing authority among policymaking
bodies at intervals reflecting their capacity and competence, a guarantor of
last resort can promote both.

